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INTRODUCTION

A variety of modern technologies reveal individual behaviors
that have environmental consequences with increasing clarity.1 Smart
meters and related technologies detect detailed information about
when and how individuals use electricity within the home. 2 Radio
frequency identification ("RFID") chips embedded in recycling
collection bins track household recycling behaviors, including
everything from whether the household is recycling to whether its
members properly separate their recyclables. 3 Regulators use aerial
imagery and geographic information systems ("GIS") technology to
detect violations of local building codes 4 and the illegal filling of

1.
I refer to this data interchangeably as personal or individual environmental
information. A variety of technologies can be used to monitor environmental behaviors. E.g.,
TEXAS INSTRUMENTS, LEARN MORE ABOUT RFID TECHNOLOGY AND WASTE MANAGEMENT
SYSTEMS, available at http://www.ti.com/rfid/docs/manuals/brochures/TlWasteManagement
Brochure081108.pdf (describing chips that can be installed in trash receptacles and used to
monitor household waste activities, including recycling); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 194 (2008) (summarizing Clive Thompson's review of Southern California
Edison's creative efforts to encourage energy conservation, including the "Ambient Orb, a little
ball that glows red when a customer is using lots of energy but green when energy use is
modest"); Frederick R. Fucci & Annette Nichols, Alternative Energy Options for Buildings:
Distributed Generation, in THE LAW OF GREEN BUILDINGS: REGULATORY AND LEGAL ISSUES IN
DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION, OPERATIONS AND FINANCING 125, 125-68 (J. Cullen Howe & Michael B.
Gerrard eds., 2010) (describing how smart metering devices can allow utilities and consumers to
track power use by individual appliances); Saqib Rahim, They Don't Talk Trash, They Track It,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/03/26/26climatewire-they-donttalk-trash-they-track-it-76922.html (describing MIT programs that allow for the tracking of
individual items of household trash and a device that monitors data about individual bicycle
use). See generally Steven Lohr, The Internet Gets Physical, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2011, at SRI
(describing an incipient boom in the use of low-cost sensors, including a new digital thermostat
that "senses not just air temperature, but the movements of people in a house, their comings and
goings, and adjusts room temperatures accordingly to save energy").
2.
For a general overview of smart meter technology, or advanced metering infrastructure
("AMI"), see EDISON ELEC. INST., WHITE PAPER: SMART METERS AND SMART METER SYSTEMS: A
METERING INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE 7-12 (2011). See also Cheryl Dancey Balough, Privacy
Implications of Smart Meters, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 161, 165-68 (2011) (describing how smart
meters can track household behaviors that consume energy).
3.
Mary Catherine O'Connor, RFID: Recycling Research by Radio, WASTE AGE, Oct. 28,
2011,
http://waste360.com/radio-frequency-identification-rfid/rfid-recycling-research-radio
(describing the use of RFID tags in Charleston County, South Carolina).
Kevin Werbach, Sensors and Sensibilities, 28 CARDOzO L. REV. 2321, 2356-57 (2007)
4.
("'he Baltimore city housing department has begun to use aerial photographs to locate illegal
rooftop decks. The agency purchased aerial photographs of the entire city, and used software to
match those images against databases of building permits.").
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wetlands. 5 Interactive "ecomaps" allow city residents to compare
environmental performance by zip code. 6 Even information generated
for entirely distinct purposes (for example, Global Positioning System
("GPS") devices for vehicles) yields insights into environmental
behaviors (for example, driving behavior related to gas consumption).7
At the same time that the technological capability to identify
(or
consequences
with environmental
behaviors
individual
environmentally significant individual behaviors8 ) is growing
dramatically, many are also calling for environmental law and policy
to reduce the environmental harms that those behaviors cause or
exacerbate. 9 Indeed, the ability to detect and better understand the
5.
Massachusetts, for example, established an Office of Geographic and Environmental
Information (MassGIS), MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, § 4A (West 2011), maintains state GIS
data on a publicly available website, available at http://www.mass.gov/mgis/massgis.htm (last
visited June 20, 2012), and uses GIS data in support of environmental regulation-the
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection uses GIS to identify violations of the
Wetlands Protection Act, APPLIED GEOGRAPHICS, INC., A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR MASSACHUSETTS'
SPATIAL DATA INFRASTRUCTURE 4, 14 (2007) ("DEP developed an automated process combining
aerial imagery and GIS mapping to look for changes within wetland areas over time. In a matter
of months, this effort identified hundreds of potential violations and led to enforcement actions
totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars .... ").
Explore San Francisco'sGreenhouse Gas Emissions by Zip Code, URBAN ECOMAF SAN
6.
FRANCISCO, http://sf.urbanecomap.orgi?locale=enUS#/explore (last visited June 25, 2012).
7.

NEXTRAQ, WHITE PAPER: FIVE WAYS TO REDUCE FUEL CONSUMPTION USING GPS

TRACKING, available at http://www.nextraq.com/images/documents/wpfiveways_toreduce-fuel
_consumption white-paper.pdf (describing how business owners can use GPS to reduce fleet gas
consumption, including by reporting on vehicle idling rates and vehicle speeds).
8.
This term encompasses behaviors of individuals that, taken alone, have a negligible
impact on the environment but, in the aggregate, can significantly harm the environment.
Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV." The Individual as Regulated Entity in the
New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 518 (2004) ("We are polluters. Each of us.
We pollute when we drive our cars, fertilize and mow our yards, pour household chemicals on the
ground or down the drain, and engage in myriad other common activities. Although each activity
contributes minute amounts of pollutants, when aggregated across millions of individuals, the
total amounts are stunning.").
9.
See, e.g., JASON J. CZARNEZKI, EVERYDAY ENVIRONMENTALISM: LAW NATURE &
INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR (2011) (detailing the environmental impacts of everyday behaviors,
reviewing existing attempts to change those behaviors, and suggesting forward-going policy
approaches); Hope M. Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility for Improving the
Environment: Moving Toward a New Environmental Norm, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117, 12021 (2009) (discussing individual contributions to environmental problems through polluting
behavior); John C. Dernbach, Harnessing Individual Behavior to Address Climate Change:
Options for Congress, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 107, 121 (2008) (advising how climate legislation can
better engage individuals); Andrew Green, Self Control, Individual Choice, and Climate Change,
26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 77, 81-82 (2008) (assuming that individuals "have values or norms that favor
environmental action," but questioning the capacity to make choices consistent with such values
and norms); Katrina Fischer Kuh, When Government Intrudes: Regulating Individual Behaviors
that Harm the Environment, 61 DUKE L.J. 1111 (2012) (examining the feasibility of direct
regulation of environmentally significant individual behaviors); Albert C. Lin, Evangelizing
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contributions of individuals to environmental harms may itself spur
action to address those harms-"[a]s with other cases where a 'do
nothing' response has been presumed to be appropriate, the logic for
ignoring small harms collapses as the cost of tracking and
internalizing them drops."'10 Scholars suggest that a variety of
strategies, some relatively novel in the context of environmental law,
will likely be needed to effectively regulate environmentally
significant individual behaviors." These strategies for influencing
individual behaviors can be grouped by type. 12 Government can
Climate Change, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1135 (2009) (emphasizing the role of values and
evaluating strategies for changing behaviors within the American evangelical community);
James Salzman, Sustainable Consumption and the Law, 27 EINVTL. L. 1243, 1250, 1255-56
(1997) (explaining the connection between consumption and environmental harm); Stephanie M.
Stern, Smart-Grid: Technology and the Psychology of Environmental Behavior Change, 86 CHI.KENT L. REV. 139 (2011) (critiquing efforts to achieve voluntary changes in individual
environmental behaviors and recommending increased reliance on automated, technological
approaches for reducing individual environmental harms); Vandenbergh, supra note 8; Michael
P. Vandenbergh et al., Implementing the Behavioral Wedge: Designing and Adopting Effective
Carbon Emissions Reduction Programs, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10547, 10551 (2010) (making
recommendations to policymakers about how best to achieve reductions in harms from
environmentally significant individual behaviors); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Jack Barkenbus &
Jonathan Gilligan, Individual Carbon Emissions: The Low-Hanging Fruit, 55 UCLA L. REV.
1701 (2008) (identifying individual greenhouse-gas-emitting behaviors most susceptible to
change and suggesting strategies for changing them); Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C.
Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673, 1724 (2007) (suggesting
that a mixture of information provision, incentive schemes, and regulatory provisions may be
needed to induce individuals to reduce their carbon footprints); Jed S. Ela, Comment, Law and
Norms in Collective Action: Maximizing Social Influence to Minimize Carbon Emissions, 27
UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 93 (2009) (arguing for a national norm campaign to reduce individual
GHG emissions that targets highly visible behaviors); Nathan Ostrander, Note, Consumer
Liability for Harms Linked to Purchases, 2 ARIz. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 111 (2011) (proposing a
consumption tort to hold individuals accountable for environmental harms). See generally
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 183-96 (observing that "[iun the United States, national
emissions limitations imposed on major pollution sources have been the rule, not the exception,"
criticizing this command-and-control regime, and suggesting strategies for achieving voluntary
changes in individual behavior, for example by providing feedback and information).
10. Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
115, 184-85, 196-97 (2004) (arguing that technological advances will render individual harms
more visible and more susceptible to control: "As transaction costs fall, the efficiency gains from
internalizing the externality will outweigh the administrative burden in more and more
circumstances.").
11. Dernbach, supra note 9, at 123-24, 132, 144; Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note
9, at 1724 (explaining the need to use norm activation and traditional regulatory measures,
"includ[ing] taxes or subsidies, cap-and-trade schemes, standards that regulate the efficiency of
consumer projects made by industrial firms, and support for new technologies and
infrastructure").
12. Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662-63 (1998)
(describing four constraints or modalities of regulation-law, norms, the market, and
architecture-that "constitute a sum of forces that guide an individual to behave, or act, in a
given way").
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indirectly regulate environmentally significant individual behaviors
by directly regulating the market (for example, subsidizing the
purchase of hybrid cars or taxing the purchase of SUVs), architecture
(for example, adopting smart growth zoning laws), or norms (for
example, funding a public information campaign). 13 Government can
also directly regulate environmentally significant individual behaviors
by imposing mandates on individuals (for example, passing anti-idling
14
laws that impose civil fines for excessive idling).
Every modality for regulating environmentally significant
individual behaviors could benefit from the kind of information about
5
those behaviors that technology is increasingly making available.'
For example, smart meters can provide households with more finegrained information about electricity use, thereby supporting
voluntary reductions in electricity use. 16 The explosion of access to
individual environmental data thus presents a great opportunity for
environmental law and policy.' 7 Just as the need to use law to
influence environmentally significant behaviors is becoming urgent
and strategies for doing so are coming into focus, a range of
technologies is poised to assist in that endeavor by generating
information about individual environmental behaviors.
The use of technology to reveal individual environmental
information can, however, impose privacy harms as well as yield

13. Id.; see also Kuh, supra note 9 (applying Lessig's taxonomy of regulation in the context
of the regulation of environmentally significant individual behaviors).
14. Vandenbergh, Barkenbus & Gilligan, supra note 9, at 1723-30 (calculating the
environmental benefits of changes in idling behavior and describing the use of anti-idling laws in
conjunction with public information campaigns to reduce vehicle idling).
15. In calling for increased attention to the potential for automated technology to reduce
individual environmental harms, Professor Stern observed the following:
The focus on individual behavior change, and the comparative neglect of automated
technology, has left gaps in both residential pollution policy and environmental
scholarship. The future of environmental psychology and law will inevitably
intertwine more tightly with technology to focus on how behavioral research informs
technological innovation, consumer preferences, and technology adoption.
Stern, supra note 9, at 160.
16. E.g., Elias L. Quinn & Adam L. Reed, Envisioning the Smart Grid: Network
Architecture, Information Control, and the Public Policy BalancingAct, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 833,
870 (2010) ("The provision of information and other signals to modify social norms and prompt
pro-environmental behaviors related to energy use and demand-side appliance and energy
efficiency investment are seen as effective means of drawing down demand.").
17. Indeed, technological advance, and, in particular, the opportunities that it provides to
fill information gaps, present significant opportunities to improve environmental regulation. See
Esty, supra note 10 (explaining how technology can reduce information gaps and thereby
improve environmental regulation).
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regulatory benefits. 18 And as technology eases constraints on the
information that is feasible to collect, raising possibilities for using
that information to support the regulation of environmentally
significant individual behaviors, privacy concerns will-and shouldemerge and lead to new constraints on the collection and use of that
information.1 9 Ultimately, the availability for regulatory purposes of
the personal environmental information rendered newly accessible by
technology will be defined in part by whether and how privacy
concerns result in limits on the collection or use of that information.
Accordingly, an appraisal of the potential regulatory benefits of
technology-enabled personal environmental information must include
not only a discussion of what information is technologically feasible to
collect and how that information could aid regulation, but also a
recognition that the ability to collect and use such information will
likely be tempered by privacy-based limits.
The tension between technology and privacy is neither new nor
20
limited to the collection of personal environmental information. It
has long been recognized that advances in technology-from the
expand the quality,
camera 21 to the computer 22 to RFID 23-can

18. For discussions of the potential privacy concerns raised by smart meters, see ELIAS
LEAKE QUINN, SMART METERING & PRIVACY: EXISTING LAW AND COMPETING POLICIES, A REPORT
FOR THE COLORADO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION 9-16 (2009); Balough, supra note 2; Jack I.
Lerner & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Taking the "Long View" on the Fourth Amendment: Stored
Records and the Sanctity of the Home, 2008 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (2008); Sonia K. McNeil,
Privacy and the Modern Grid, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 199 (2011).
19. Privacy policies are presently developing for smart meter technology. See infra notes
230-33 and accompanying text.
20. Many scholars have described the privacy harms occasioned by technological advance
and explored the associated legal implications, in particular with respect to government access to
information. E.g., CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2007); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON:
TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2004); Daniel J. Solove, Access and
Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1193 (2002)
[hereinafter Solove, Access and Aggregation] (describing the privacy concerns associated with the
maintenance of personally identifiable information in public records); Christopher Slobogin,
TransactionalSurveillance by the Government, 75 MISS. L.J. 139 (2005); Daniel J. Solove, Digital
Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083 (2002)
[hereinafter Solove, Digital Dossiers] (describing the privacy concerns created by the
accumulation of personally identifiable information by third parties); Alan F. Westin, Science,
Privacy, and Freedom: Issues and Proposalsfor the 1970's, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1003 (1966).
21. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 211
(1890) (discussing the privacy implications of the advance in camera technology, allowing
photographers to take pictures more quickly and without the consent of the subject).
22. U.S. PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM'N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY
APP. 5, at 61-65 (1977) (reporting to Congress and the President on "rechnology and Privacy," in
particular the effect of computer-based record-keeping systems on privacy).
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quantity, and accessibility of personal information 24 and, in so doing,
diminish privacy. 25 Technology continues to increase the ability to
detect and record individual behaviors; modern computing further
allows for the volumes of amassed data to be readily compiled and
searched. 26 An individual's electronic trail includes everything from
location information transmitted by cell phones and GPS devices in
cars to information about personal consumption choices recorded
during online transactions or when using store savings cards. One
scholar describes "the rise of. . . 'digital dossiers':
Every day, rivulets of information stream into electric brains to be sifted, sorted,
rearranged, and combined in hundreds of different ways. Digital technology enables the
preservation of the minutia of our everyday comings and goings, of our likes and
dislikes, of who we are and what we own. It is ever more possible to create an electronic
collage that covers much of a person's life-a life captured2 7 in records, a digital person
composed in the collective computer networks of the world.

Justice Alito offers this description:
In some locales, closed-circuit television video monitoring is becoming ubiquitous. On
toll roads, automatic toll collection systems create a precise record of the movements of
motorists who choose to make use of that convenience. Many motorists purchase cars
that are equipped with devices that permit a central station to ascertain the car's
location at any time ....
Perhaps most significant, cell phones and other
wireless
28
devices now permit wireless carriers to track and record the location of users.

Many advocate limiting the collection, distribution, and/or use
of the personal information revealed or rendered available through

23. E.g., Serena G. Stein, Note, Where Will Consumers Find Privacy Protection from
RFIDs?:A Case for Federal Legislation, 2007 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 20-22 (proposing federal
regulation of RFID to protect privacy).
24. The term "personal information" is used throughout this Article to refer broadly to
information about a specific individual. For a more in-depth discussion of the definition of
"personal information," see Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND.
L. REV. 1609, 1617-18 (1999).
25. Scientific advances in other fields can have similar effects. See Janet L. Dolgin,
Personhood, Discrimination, and the New Genetics, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 755, 780-86 (2000)
(describing the privacy concerns raised by and the inadequacy of privacy protections governing
genome mapping). Additionally, technology can have other unintended effects (of which privacy
incursions are simply one). For an overview of managing the unexpected or unintended effects of
emerging technologies, see Albert C. Lin, Technology Assessment 2.0: Revamping Our Approach
to Emerging Technologies, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1309 (2011) (advocating for more robust technology
assessment).
26. SOLOVE, supra note 20, at 2, 13-26 (describing the compilation and growth of
searchable databases and observing that "[d]ata is digitized into binary numerical form, which
enables computers to store and manipulate it with unprecedented efficiency").
27. Id. at 1.
28. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
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technological advance: 29 scholars warn of technology-enabled threats
to privacy and freedom and propose limits on the collection and use of
personal information; 30 legislatures act to limit the collection and use
of such information;3 1 and courts impose their own limits in some
contexts. 32 Although many lament that privacy protections have not
been augmented in a more comprehensive and robust way in response
to new technological capabilities, 33 privacy concerns have motivated
34
the imposition of privacy limits on a number of technologies.
The literature and debate about the optimal balance between
technological benefits and privacy generally, 35 as well as the law that

29. E.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortressor Frontierfor
Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 242 (1992) (critiquing then-existing privacy
protections and proposing the establishment of a "privacy board" to police commercial
information processing activities).
30. E.g., Jack S. Balkin, Essay, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93
MINN. L. REV. 1, 15-17, 21 (2008) (identifying "three major dangers for our freedoms" posed by
government use of new information-gathering and computing technology, and advocating the
enactment of "superstatutes to regulate the collection, collation, purchase, and analysis of data");
Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1373 (2000) (arguing for restrictions on data mining to protect informational privacy);
Schwartz, supra note 24, at 1670-81 (advocating for the application of four fair information
standards to cyberspace, including through the establishment of a United States Data Protection
Commission).
31.
See infra notes 207-19 and accompanying text (describing statutory limits on the
collection and/or use of personal information using RFID and smart meters).
32. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945 (applying Fourth Amendment protections to police use of
global positioning devices); see also Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other
Fourth Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614, 642 (2011)
(reviewing appellate cases extending Fourth Amendment protection to digital communications
despite intermediary storage).
33. E.g., James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH.
L. REV. 1, 58-81 (2003) (critiquing U.S. privacy policy in part for relying too heavily on individual
self-policing and market strategies and suggesting that informational privacy be conceptualized
as a societal good to support a more comprehensive regulatory approach).
34. E.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U. S.C. § 552a(o)-(r) (2006) (limiting the use of computerized
"matching' by federal agencies); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§
2511-20, 2701-07 (2006) (imposing limits on the government's unauthorized collection of
information from modern forms of communication); Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47
U.S.C. § 551 (2006) (imposing privacy rules on cable service providers, including limits on the
collection and disclosure of personal information). Motivated in part by privacy concerns, some
communities have enacted moratoriums (often disregarded by installing utilities) on the
deployment of smart meter technology. E.g., Clearlake Bans PG&E Smart Meters, Utility
Unfazed, SMARTGRID
TODAY (Apr. 2,
2011),
http://www.smartgridtoday.com/public/
ClearlakebansPG.cfm (describing an ordinance enacted by the city of Clearlake, California,
seeking to impose a moratorium on PG&E smart meter installation).
35. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 483-84
(describing the need to balance privacy against countervailing interests); Westin, supra note 20,
at 1206 (discussing the need for "a structured and rational weighing process with definite
criteria by which public and private authorities can gauge claims for disclosure or surveillance
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has developed in some contexts to define that balance, 36 can greatly
inform thinking about how the balance between regulatory benefits
and privacy will or should be struck in the specific context of personal
environmental information. However, important context-specific
considerations will ultimately shape this inquiry.3 7 For an optimal
balance to be struck in the context of personal environmental
information-a balance that embodies a deliberate and thoughtful
weighing of regulatory benefits and privacy values 3 8-policymakers
will need to understand the potential environmental benefits offered
by access to personal environmental information as well as the
associated privacy costs. 39 Both of these variables are, to a significant
degree, context specific. Identifying the benefits of access to personal
environmental information requires an understanding of how that
information could enhance the regulation of environmentally
significant behaviors. Similarly, the privacy costs of obtaining
personal environmental information will be defined by considerations
specific to the collection and use of the information in support of
regulation and, possibly, an evaluation of the value of privacy in
through new devices" to balance privacy with other competing values and proposing balancing
criteria).
36. Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 263 (2002)
(describing the tension between technology and privacy and encouraging active debate to achieve
a thoughtful resolution).
37. The discussion of the balance between benefits and privacy harms with respect to the
use of personal health information in support of health research provides an example of how the
context can shape this analysis. E.g., Fred H. Cate, ProtectingPrivacy in Health Research: The
Limits of Individual Choice, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1765, 1778-98 (2010) (describing how personal
health information could aid health research and critiquing privacy-based constraints on access
to that information).
38. For a thoughtful description of this type of balancing, see EUROPEAN COMM'N, TOWARDS
RESPONSIBLE

RESEARCH

AND

INNOVATION

IN

THE

INFORMATION

AND

COMMUNICATION

TECHNOLOGIES AND SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES FIELDS 93 (Ren6 von Schomberg ed., 2011),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-society/document library/pdf-6/mep-rapport2011_en.pdf ("[Tihe aim of any balancing is not to weigh one right against another, but more
precisely, to reconcile the multiple values that constitute the backbone of the democratic State..
. [Tihe point of striking a balance between two values (whose antagonism might be irreducible
at some point) is to preserve and enforce both of them in the best possible way.").
39. Professor Westin provided the following explanation:
Though surveillance devices are sometimes used as a means of satisfying voyeuristic
personal urges and as illegitimate weapons in political or private affairs, the more
typical and important situation involves use by a public or private authority to cope
with a problem of genuine social importance.... But if all that need be done to win
legal and social approval for surveillance is to indicate a social problem and show that
surveillance would help cope with it, there is no balancing at all, only a qualifying
procedure for a license to invade privacy. Therefore, the need involved must be serious
enough to overcome the very real risk of jeopardizing the public's confidence in its
daily freedom from unreasonable invasions of privacy.
Westin, supranote 20, at 1206.
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environmental information. Relevant context-specific considerations
include what information is needed to support regulatory goals, the
methods for obtaining that information, and the ultimate use of the
information.
This Article begins from the premise that successful regulation
of environmentally significant individual behaviors could achieve
meaningful environmental benefits and argues that (1) technology is
increasingly making information about individual environmental
behaviors and associated harms more accessible; (2) better
information about environmentally significant individual behaviors
could substantially enhance fledgling efforts to regulate those
behaviors; and (3) use of technology-enabled personal environmental
information in support of regulation will require the resolution of
myriad privacy concerns. The Article seeks to generate and inform a
discussion about the appropriate balance between access to personal
environmental information and privacy by identifying how regulation
can benefit from personal environmental information, illustrating the
trade-offs that can arise between regulation and privacy, and
suggesting some initial thoughts to guide the identification and
evaluation of privacy harms associated with access to personal
environmental information. Part II describes how new technologies
generate information about individual environmental behaviors and
demonstrates how that information can enhance efforts to influence
environmentally significant individual behaviors. Part III provides a
preliminary overview of the privacy harms occasioned or threatened
by the collection of personal environmental information. Part IV
reviews some existing and proposed limits on the collection or use of
personal information, motivated primarily by efforts to protect privacy
in light of technological advance, to illustrate the trade-offs that can
arise between regulation and privacy.
Personal environmental information could greatly aid efforts to
influence environmentally significant individual behaviors, but the
availability of that information depends upon successful resolution of
associated privacy concerns. A failure to recognize the regulatory
benefits of personal environmental information could result in privacy
controls that too greatly and unnecessarily constrain access to
information. A failure to recognize the privacy harms occasioned by
the development of personal environmental information could not only
impose unwarranted privacy harms but, once these harms are
discovered, could also spur a backlash that even more greatly
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constrains access to personal environmental information. 40 More
generally, a failure to properly conceptualize and understand either
the regulatory benefits or privacy harms associated with access to
personal environmental information could lead to a suboptimal
balance of access to information and privacy. Environmental scholars
can contribute to debates about access to personal environmental
information by explaining the potential regulatory benefits of such
access and helping to understand and value associated privacy harms.
The decisions that emerge will shape the technological and regulatory
41
tools available to control individual environmental harms.
II. THE PROMISE OF PERSONAL ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION
Adapting environmental law and policy to better and more
directly address individual behavior-as opposed to the behavior of
large, industrial sources of pollution-presents a significant
challenge. 42 Individuals constitute a regulatory target that is notably
distinct from the archetypal regulatory target in environmental law,
the polluting factory. 43 Individuals are more numerous and more
widely dispersed. They contribute to pollution in amounts that are
often invisible at the time of release, impose harms that are frequently
chronic (as opposed to acute), and become significant only when
aggregated over time or with the contributions of others. 44 Individuals
may also respond differently to regulatory intervention (for example,
because of cognitive limitations), and government efforts to control
individual behaviors may be more likely to raise objections of
45
government intrusion.
40. Recent legislative proposals to forbid or curtail the EPA's use of aerial surveillance to
monitor compliance with environmental laws-an existing agency practice that provoked an
outcry only after it was widely and erroneously publicized as being conducted using dronesprovide an apt and timely example. E.g., H.R. 5961, 112th Cong. (2012) ("To provide reasonable
limits, control, and oversight over the Environmental Protection Agency's use of aerial
surveillance of America's farmers."); see also David A. Fahrenthold, Reining in the Rumor About
EPA 'Drones,' WASH. POST, June 16, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/reining-inthe-rumors-about-epa-drones/2012/06/16/gJQAwWjkhV story.html.
41. Indeed, in light of the "complex nature" of the challenge of balancing technological
advance and privacy, Justice Breyer "calls for resolution through a form of participatory
democracy" that involves a "national conversation" conducted in part through "journal articles"
and with the full participation of lawyers. Breyer, supranote 36, at 263.
42. Vandenbergh, supra note 8, at 518 ("Treating individuals as regulated entities .. will
require fundamental changes in the theories and methods of environmental law.").
43. Id. at 585-97 (describing the distinctive characteristics of individuals as a source
category).
44. Id.
45. Id.
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Lawrence Lessig offers a useful taxonomy for understanding
the tools available to a modern regulatory regime when it seeks to
regulate behavior. 46 He identifies four constraints that regulate
4
behavior: law (or mandates), norms, the market, and architecture.
Laws, or mandates, regulate behavior by imposing requirements on
behavior and providing sanctions if behavior does not heed those
requirements. 48 Norms regulate behavior "not through the centralized
enforcement of a state,"49 but through expectations on behavior
imposed by the community (in the case of external, or social, norms) or
by individuals themselves (in the case of internal, or personal,
norms).50 Markets constrain and influence behavior through the
device of price. 5 1 Architecture means "features of the world-whether
made or found-[that] restrict and enable in a way that directs or
affects behavior" 52 and includes, for example, the built environment.
Architecture can thus constrain behavior by defining available
public
is impossible
to
take
transportation
behaviors-it
transportation if none exists.
These four constraints, or modalities of regulation, "constitute
the sum of forces that guide an individual to behave, or act in a given
way."53 Government can influence individual behaviors by utilizing
any of these four modalities of regulation. Government can, of course,
enact laws, or mandates, that directly regulate individuals by
"tell[ing] individuals how they ought to behave and... threaten[ing]
punishment if they deviate from that directed behavior. '54 It can also,
however, enact laws aimed at changing norms, the market, or features
of architecture that will in turn influence individual behaviors.
Accordingly, government could regulate environmentally significant
individual behaviors directly (through mandates) or indirectly (by

46. Lessig, supra note 12, at 661-72 (describing how law regulates individuals in order to
explain "the project of the New Chicago School"); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER
LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 85-99 (1999).

47. Lessig, supra note 12, at 662-67 (identifying norms, architecture, markets, and laws as
four "constraints, or modalities of regulation" that are "each subject to law" and proposing that
'law not only regulates behavior directly, but law also regulates behavior indirectly, by
regulating these other modalities of regulation directly').
48. Id. at 664.
49. Id. at 662.
50. Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 9, at 1706 (describing the difference between
personal and social norms).
51.
Lessig, supra note 12, at 663.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 671.
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regulating norms, the market, or architecture). This Part identifies
how the regulation of environmentally significant individual behaviors
using each of these modalities is being or could be enhanced by using
personal environmental information generated (or potentially
generated) by advances in technology.
A. InformationalRegulation/Norm Management
Informational regulation and norm management may be the
most promising approaches for regulating environmentally significant
individual behaviors. 5 These approaches seek to provide individuals
with information that persuades them to voluntarily change their
behavior.5 6 Individuals might voluntarily curtail environmentally
harmful behaviors because they learn of previously unknown costs
that the behavior imposes on them. 57 They might also change their
behavior because they believe that they should (internal, or personal,
norms) 58 or because they believe that society thinks that they should
(external, or social, norms). 59
The government can use information to encourage voluntary
changes in environmental behaviors by influencing, or managing, the
norms governing those behaviors. Technology that generates better

55. Dernbach, supra note 9, at 123-24, 132, 144; Ela, supra note 9, at 116-17;
Vandenbergh, supra note 8, at 608 ("Perhaps the most important implication of the new focus on
individuals as polluters is the need to look beyond the command and control versus economic
incentives debate to informational regulation and norm management."). But see Stern, supra
note 9, at 147-53 (identifying obstacles to changing environmental behaviors through
informational regulation and norm management and observing that "1l]egal scholarship ... has
focused disproportionately on altering norms and inculcating civic virtue").
56. Vandenbergh, supranote 8, at 608-16 (evaluating how informational regulation can be
used to influence environmentally significant individual behaviors).
57. Id. at 610 (using as an example that "careless use of household pesticides might change
if individuals were aware that 80 percent of all pesticide exposure occurs from household
pesticide use").
58. Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of
InternalizedNorms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1583 (2000) (characterizing a personal or internal norm
as one where the individual "intrinsically values obeying a social norm [and] will pay something
to obey the norm for its own sake, independent of any resulting advantage or disadvantage. In
the language of economics, intrinsic value implies a 'taste' for obeying the norm."); see also
Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 9, at 1706 (explaining the difference between personal
and social norms: "Personal norms are informal obligations that are enforced through an
internalized sense of duty to act, as well as guilt or elated emotions for a failure to act.").
59. Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 338, 358-66 (1997) (setting forth an esteem theory of social or external norm development);
see also Andrew Green, Norms, Institutions, and the Environment, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 105, 11213 (2007) (assessing the potential for government to influence environmental values and norms
and comparing and contrasting internal (personal) and external (social) norms).
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information about individual environmental behaviors can aid norm
management by educating individuals and the public about the
environmental harms occasioned by individual behaviors. This can
encourage the development of concrete norms against those behaviors
(to the extent that the imposition of environmental harms contravenes
preexisting abstract norms) 60 and facilitate the development of new or
more robust social norms governing individual environmental
61
behaviors.
The environmental harms occasioned by individual behaviors
62
are frequently difficult for individuals to recognize or comprehend.
This difficulty arises because: the amount of pollution or harm an
individual inflicts may be unknown; an individual's contribution may
cause harm only when aggregated with the contributions of others; the
harms imposed by an individual may manifest at great temporal
and/or geographic distance; and the causes of resulting harms, and in
particular the contribution of one individual to those harms, may be
unclear:
[W]ith individuals, there are often many sources of the pollutant.... tElach release is
often of a small quantity over any given time period and will only comprise a large
quantity when aggregated with numerous other individual releases or when measured
over a long time period .... T]he release or other activity that causes the environmental
harm is often not visible when caused by individuals .... Not only are the releases from
any one individual smaller and less visible, but the harms arising from individual
behavior in many cases are less visible as well. In fact, environmental harm may only
arise from individual behavior when many sources are aggregated. In addition, the low
concentrations and long time periods involved in many releases from individuals make
it more likely that these releases will generate gradual, and in some cases almost
imperceptible, changes in ecosystem health ....Similarly, the human health
effects of
63
many types of individual behavior are more likely to be chronic than acute.

The lack of a clear connection between an individual behavior
and specific environmental harm is a significant obstacle to achieving
voluntary changes in behavior. 64 "[I]nformation can activate norms

60. See generally Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Social Meaning of Environmental
Command and Control, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 191, 217 (2001) ("To address second generation
sources, the law could be used to tie individual actions to the environmental harms they cause.").
61.
See generally Esty, supra note 10, at 190 ("Although the emergence of environmental
protection as a societal goal predates the Information Age, more visible harms, information on
best practices, transparency, and the democratization of decisionmaking may reinforce the
inculcation of environmental values and help to speed up the norm consolidation process.").
62. Vandenbergh, supra note 8, at 585-96 (describing the salient aspects of
environmentally significant individual behaviors and the harms that they occasion).
63. Id. at 589-90.
64. Technological advance may allow for better detection and understanding of the
environmental harms of aggregated individual actions. Esty, supra note 10, at 162 (discussing
how tracking the catch of fishing fleets collectively can reveal impacts on fish stocks even where
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and induce behavior change if it creates a new belief that a value is
threatened and that the individual can act to reduce the threat."6 5 In
particular, information relating to two types of beliefs may be integral
for activating norms: "(1) an awareness of the consequences of the
individual's act regarding the objects of an abstract norm (referred to
as 'AC'), and (2) an ascription of personal responsibility for causing or
preventing those consequences (referred to as 'AR')." 66 A concrete norm
will develop to govern a specific behavior where individuals recognize
the connection between that behavior and an abstract norm that it is
designed to serve, for example, connecting the choice not to litter and
environmental protection. 6 7 That an individual or group adheres to an
abstract norm of environmental protection will do little to change a
behavior that the individual or group does not understand to have a
meaningful environmental consequence. Thus, for example, even if an
individual possesses a strong abstract norm of environmental
protection, that individual will be unlikely to adopt a concrete norm of
not idling his or her car if he or she mistakenly believes that it takes
68
more gas to turn a car off and then on than to simply idle the car.
"a single fisherman or fishing boat seemingly has no effect on fish stocks"). It may also shed light
on the human health impacts of pollution (the connection between a specific chemical and cancer,
for example). Esty offered the following analysis:
In combination with extraordinary new data production and collection in genomics
and medicine, we stand on the verge of more scientifically robust answers to questions
about how much harm pollutants cause to particular individuals ....
The sweeping
potential for improved causal specification derives not only from new analytic tools
developed in the environmental field, but also from the computer-enabled knowledge
revolution occurring within other disciplines, including public health, epidemiology,
hydrology, statistical modeling, and risk-benefit analysis.
Id. at 158-59 (citations omitted). For example, GIS can be used to study potential links between
historical environmental exposures (for example, to pesticides) and cancer. THERESA C. KENNEDY
ET AL., MODELING HISTORICAL ENVIRONMENTAL

EXPOSURES USING GIS: IMPLICATIONS FOR

DISEASE SURVEILLANCE (2003), available at http://gis2.esri.com/library/userconf/healthO3/papers/
pap302/p3020.htm (exploring the use of GIS to track historical environmental exposures and
breast cancer rates in Cape Cod).
65. Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 9, at 1707 (describing a theory of norm
development in the social psychology literature, the Values-Beliefs-Norms (VBN) theory,
developed by Paul Stern and colleagues).
66. Id. at 1707-08 (further explaining the VBN theory).
67. For a discussion of the relationship between concrete and abstract norms, see Cooter,
supra note 58, at 1595-96 ("Behind our particular preferences lie more general, abstract
preferences."); McAdams, supra note 59, at 382-86 (explaining the difference between broad and
narrow norms); Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 9, at 1706 (describing "both specific,
concrete norms and generalized, abstract norms").
68. Vandenbergh, Barkenbus & Gilligan, supra note 9, at 1725 (identifying the common
"false belief[ ]" that "shutting off the engine briefly and then restarting it consumes more fuel
and produces more pollution than allowing the engine to idle," explaining that restarting
"consumes less fuel and emits less pollution than idling for 5 to 10 seconds," and discussing how
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Similarly, even if a community possesses a strong abstract norm of
environmental protection, the community will be unlikely to sanction
idling (thereby supporting a concrete norm against idling) if the
community mistakenly believes that it takes more gas to turn a car off
and then on than to simply idle the car.
Thus, information about the connection between individual
behaviors and environmental harms can be crucial for norms to spur
voluntary behavior change. For example, to promote a norm of carbon
neutrality, one scholar recommends the establishment of an
Individual Carbon Release Inventory that would use national surveys
to develop "information about the aggregate emissions attributable to
'6 9
individual behavior and the emissions of the average individual.
The scholar further posits that "[i]n addition to information about
carbon emissions, individuals require information about the types of
behavior changes that will generate emissions reductions, both to
activate norms and provide knowledge of what steps to take once the
70
individual feels an obligation to act."
Technological advance allows for the development and
communication of information that can help individuals and
communities better understand the connection between their
behaviors and environmental harms and thereby support the
activation and development of norms governing specific, concrete
individual behaviors.7 1 Well-designed public information campaigns
could help educate the public about the connection between certain
behaviors and environmental harms and do not require access to or
the use of personal environmental information. 72 However, a specific
account of the harm caused by an individual enabled by access to
a public education campaign could be used as one element of an effort to reduce personal motor
vehicle idling).
69. Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 9, at 1729-31.
70. Id. at 1731.
71.
For example, technology enables consumer-friendly services to compile sophisticated
data about the environmental attributes of products; this can help individuals understand the
environmental impacts of their consumption decisions. Robert H. Cutting et al., Spill the Beans:
GoodGuide, Walmart and EPA Use Information as Efficient, Market-Based Environmental
Regulation, 24 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 291, 314-15, 328-29 (2011) (describing how GoodGuide
"provides a user-friendly Web site and slick iPhone application that can recognize bar codes then
display product information on the spot," employs Facebook and Twitter, and observing that the
federal government possesses significant information about businesses and products and
recommending the development and maintenance of a federal database on product and corporate
environmental performance to inform consumer decisions).
72. See, e.g., Gary T. Henry & Craig S. Gordon, Driving Less for Better Air: Impacts of a
Public Information Campaign, 22 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 45 (2003) (using surveys to
evaluate the effectiveness of a sophisticated public information campaign designed to reduce
driving and associated ozone emissions in Atlanta).
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73
personal environmental information could prove far more powerful.
For example, imagine if cars periodically (daily, weekly, annually)
flashed a screen detailing how the driver's behavior had wasted gas
(for example, by idling or speeding) and describing the environmental
impact of that wasted gas (for example, the estimated volume of
associated greenhouse gas ("GHG") emissions). 74 Through "advances
in the visual display of information," this information could be
communicated in ways that would help overcome cognitive limitations
and enable individuals to better comprehend the consequences of their
actions. 75 The design of public information campaigns could also be
improved by incorporating insights about individual environmental
behaviors available as a result of technological advance. Imagine if
GPS data could be mined to assess when, where, and why individuals
in a community most commonly idle their cars. This kind of
information could greatly inform the design of a public information
76
campaign intended to reduce idling.

73. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONN'S TASK FORCE ON THE INTERFACE BETWEEN
PSYCHOLOGY AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, PSYCHOLOGY AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE:
ADDRESSING A MULTI-FACETED PHENOMENON AND SET OF CHALLENGES 146 (2009) [hereinafter
REPORT],
available at
http://
AND
GLOBAL
CLIMATE
CHANGE
PSYCHOLOGY

www.apa.org/science/about/publications/climate-change.pdf (summarizing research showing that
providing information that is immediate or frequent and more tailored to individual
circumstances can increase the likelihood that the information will change environmental
behaviors).
74. Some cars, including my own Camry Hybrid, already communicate information about
how driving impacts fuel efficiency. Scott Doggett, 2012 Toyota Camry Hybrid Boosts Power and
Mileage, EDMUNDS AUTO OBSERVER (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.autoobserver.comI2011/08/2012.
toyota-camry-hybrid-boosts-power-and-mileage.html (reporting that the 2012 Camry Hybrid
display screen "includes an instantaneous average mpg meter that helps motorists adjust their
driving habits to achieve maximum fuel economy"). Business owners use GPS to track the fuel
efficiency of their vehicle fleets, NExTRAQ, supra note 7 (describing how business owners can use
GPS to reduce fleet gas consumption, including by reporting on vehicle idling rates and vehicle
speeds), and rental car companies have used GPS to discern when renters speed, Am. Car
Rental, Inc. v. Comm'r of Consumer Prot., 869 A.2d 1198 (Conn. 2005). Eco-driving courses are
offered in some EU member states and have been shown to reduce fuel consumption by ten to
fifteen percent. Thomas Daniel Wuertenberger, The Regulation of CO2 Emissions Caused by
PrivateHouseholds-An Analysis of the Legal Situation in the European Union and Germany, 16
MO. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 45-46 (2009) (citation omitted).
75. Esty, supra note 10, at 163 (citations omitted). Esty continued:
While no one could see the ozone layer thinning, computer-generated representations
of the expanding Antarctic ozone hole helped to induce global action in response to the
release of CFCs and other ozone-depleting chemicals. In fact, one of the areas of
greatest promise from a more data-driven approach to environmental protection is the
ability to overcome cognitive failures that have plagued problem identification and
policymaking.
Id.
76. See generally Janet A. Weiss & Mary Tschirhart, Public Information Campaigns as
Policy Instruments, 13 J. POLY ANALYSIS & MGMT. 82, 84 (1994) (identifying "captur[ing] the
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Personal environmental information can also facilitate the
development of new or more robust norms governing individual
environmental behaviors by increasing opportunities to make those
behaviors visible and comparable. 77 In this context, a behavior is
78
visible if it can be observed or measured in some way by others.
Visibility of one's own behavior supports, and may be necessary for,
the development of and compliance with social norms. 79 Additionally,
information about the behaviors of others can influence the
development of and compliance with a norm. Individuals are greatly
influenced by what they perceive to be the behaviors of others.80 For
example, comparing environmental performance (between neighbors
or communities) is a strategy that has proven particularly successful
in spurring reductions in community and household energy use. 1
A recent hospital study illustrates the potential for technology
to increase the visibility of a behavior and to spur voluntary behavior
changes as a result.8 2 In an effort to encourage hand washing,
attention of the right audience" as crucial for the success of public information campaigns and
explaining that "[c]ampaigns cannot be effective in inducing change in individuals or
communities unless they are able to deliver their message to those audiences who are the targets
of the campaign designers. ...Campaign designers must know which members of the public they
wish to reach and devise means to attract the notice of this audience.").
77. Notably, technology can sometimes transform into private behavior that used to be
public, except for a technological information trail (for example, buying one's groceries online via
FreshDirect or Peapod instead of in the full view of others at the grocery store). As one scholar
observes with reference to the increasing digitization of society, "[i]ndividuals can more readily
escape from the curious eyes of the community, freeing themselves from. . . social norms .... On

the other hand, an ever-growing series of records is created about almost every facet of a person's
life." Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 20, at 1090. On balance, however, it seems
likely that technological advances will increase visibility overall with respect to many individual
environmental behaviors that have heretofore often been difficult or impossible to discern. See
generally Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely Demise of the Fourth Amendment Third Party
Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39, 45 (2011) (comparing the privacy of purchasing a book in
person and online and concluding that purchasing online allows for costless searching and
distribution).
78. Ela, supra note 9, at 123 (describing when behavior is visible).
79. E.g., McAdams, supra note 59, at 361-62 (setting forth an esteem theory of norm
development and describing the "[i]nherent [rlisk of [d]etection" as a necessary condition).
80. Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1231, 1290 (2001); see also Cass R.
Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 945 ("Experimental work
shows that .. . agents are willing to cooperate, and hence to solve collective action problems
without coercion, if most people are seen as cooperators.").
81.
For an overview of some successful efforts to use competition to reduce energy
consumption, see Hadley Rapp, Will Hoyer & Teresa Galluzzo, Encouraging Energy Efficiency
Through Competition, IOWA POL'Y PROJECT (June 2, 2011), http:lwww.iowapolicyproject
.org/201 lResearch/ll 10602-EE-competition.html.
82. Donna Armellino et al., Using High-Technology to Enforce Low-Technology Safety
Measures: The Use of Third-party Remote Video Auditing and Real-time Feedback in Healthcare,
54 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1, 1-7 (2012); Nicholas Bakalar, Prevention: Cameras Can
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researchers installed cameras at hand-washing sinks throughout a
hospital's intensive care unit.8 3 The cameras did not collect identifying
personal information but did monitor workers as they entered and
exited patient rooms.8 4 Although workers knew about the cameras,
initially only "6.5 percent washed their hands within 10 seconds of
entering or leaving a room."8' 5 However, after researchers incorporated
a feedback system in a public hallway that announced compliance
rates, hand-washing rates rose to 81.6% within sixteen weeks and to
87.9% for the following eighteen months.8 6 In the words of the study's
lead author, "[p]eople's behavior does change when they're being
87
watched."
Presently, individual environmental behaviors, the harms that
they occasion, and the precise amount of an individual's contribution
to an environmental harm are often invisible, thereby preventing the
comparison of individuals' environmental performances.8 8 Indeed,
even efforts to identify the aggregate environmental harms from
individuals as a source, as opposed to larger industrial sources, are
relatively nascent.8 9 Technology increasingly permits the collection of
data about individual environmental harms and allows for that data
to be manipulated and disseminated. As a result of technological
advance, "[wle... are approaching the day when virtually all
emissions will be susceptible to tagging, tracking, and measurement
at relatively low cost." 90 This development can support norm
campaigns by making individual harms visible and allowing for
comparison:
Data and information on what others are doing helps to define what is possible in the
environmental arena. In many cases, governments, corporations, and households do not
have a clear picture of what might be obtained in pollution control or resource

Help Ensure Hand Washing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2012, at D6 (describing a study reported in the
journal CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES).
Bakalar, supra note 82.
83.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. For a critique of the "process/product" distinction that (1) can function to prevent
consumer access to information about the environmental harms associated with consumption
and (2) is relied upon in different areas of law and policy, see generally Douglas A. Kysar,
Preferences for Processes: The Process/ProductDistinction and the Regulation of Consumer
Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 526 (2004).
89. For the first and most significant attempt to do so to date, see Vandenbergh, supra note
8, at 539-83 (defining individuals as a source category and estimating the contribution of
individuals to a variety of environmental harms).
Esty, supra note 10, at 157.
90.
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Developing good environmental metrics thus helps to clarify
or goals.... [B]enchmarking opportunities may emerge at the
Such benchmarks could provide a real spur to action at the
society-wide potential for reduced pollution, especially if combined
how the top performers have been able to reduce their use of

Additional benchmarking gains derive from the tendency of
comparative analysis, particularly rankings, to spur competition.
Evidence that others are outperforming one's country, community, or
company on environmental criteria can heighten attention to
opportunities for improved pollution control and better resource
management. Competition not only motivates better performance; it
often sparks innovation. 91

Imagine, for example, if a car not only reported the fuel
impacts of a driver's driving habits but further compared the fuel
efficiency of that individual's driving style to other drivers in the
area. 92 Or imagine that an individual's credit card statement, or even
grocery store receipt, included a consumption analysis that not only
revealed the GHG emissions associated with recent purchases but
also, for example, compared the GHG footprint of the individual's
93
purchases to those of other similarly situated consumers.
Better information about individual environmental behaviors,
as well as more sophisticated and cost-effective methods of generating
and communicating such information, thus has the potential to
significantly enhance efforts to shape norms governing those
behaviors. Indeed, at the broadest level, this information may help to
rebut a common misconception that large industrial sources are
responsible for most environmental problems. 94 Helping individuals to
recognize that they are polluters and understand when and how they

91. Id. at 166-67 (citations omitted).
92. Some services already track the driving speed and distance of users to identify traffic
problems and share that information with other drivers. Roy Furchgott, Traffic Apps: Are We
There Yet?, N.Y. TIMES GADGETWISE BLOG (Aug. 21, 2009, 4:54 PM) http://gadgetwise.
blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/21/traffic-apps-are-we-thereyet/.
93. MasterCard, for example, offers a service to its corporate cardholders allowing them to
automatically track and analyze carbon emissions associated with travel. Press Release,
MasterCard Worldwide, MasterCard and Brighter Planet Announce New Offering to Help
Companies Manage Their Environmental Footprint (May 12, 2011) (on file with author)
(announcing the launch of the MasterCard Carbon Emissions Reporting feature, which provides
"automatic reporting and analysis of estimated travel-related carbon emissions data . . . to
corporate cardholders based on their card transactions").
94. Vandenbergh, supra note 60, at 198 (summarizing studies showing that much of the
public mistakenly attributes a variety of environmental harms caused by second generation
sources to large industrial sources of pollution).
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pollute could be an important step in changing the social consequences
95
of environmentally significant individual behaviors.
B. Market
Government can also seek to influence environmentally
96
significant individual behaviors by regulating the market (or price).
Government can, for example, discourage environmentally harmful
conduct by raising its cost. It can impose taxes (such as a gas tax),
charge for the consumption of a public environmental good (impose a
usage fee), or, more indirectly, use regulation to increase the costs to
produce environmentally harmful goods that firms then pass on to
consumers (as through a GHG cap-and-trade program that increases
the cost of energy and energy-intensive goods). Government can also
encourage environmentally beneficial conduct by lowering its cost
through subsidies or other means.
All of these market strategies have been or are presently used
to influence environmentally significant individual behaviors,
97
although scholars identify limitations as to each strategy. Most
importantly, government can't price consumption or use that it cannot
quantify. It is often difficult or impossible to charge for public
environmental goods or establish other market mechanisms, such as
tradable allowance schemes, where millions of individuals must be
regulated and the harm imposed by each is small and perhaps not
subject to quantification.9 8 Taxes, particularly as applied directly to
individuals, are "politically radioactive" to the point that "[e]ven the
strong supporters of economic measures in the academic literature
have noted that the prospects for the use of taxes or fees to control
pollution in the United States generally are dim."99 Subsidies or fees
may undercut efforts to use norms to promote good environmental
behaviors by reducing the "green halo" effect, or the good feeling
generated when an individual voluntarily makes a sacrifice in the

95. Id. at 215-19 (suggesting ways to change the social meaning communicated by
command-and-control regulation).
96. Lessig, supra note 12, at 663 (describing how markets constrain individual behavior).
97. Vandenbergh, supra note 8,at 600-08 (critically analyzing the application of economic
incentive strategies to environmentally significant individual behaviors).
98. Id. at 601 (identifying numerous difficulties employing market mechanisms to control
individual environmental behaviors, including the expense of establishing and administering
such programs, the difficulty establishing baselines and initial allocations, the low value of an
allowance, and communicating unintended social meaning about polluting).
99. Id. at 604-05 (citation omitted).
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name of environmental protection.100 Finally, individuals do not
dependably respond to price signals in expected ways, thus calling into
question an assumption underlying all of these strategies, namely that
increased cost will necessarily result in less environmentally
destructive behavior (or vice versa). 10 1
Technologically enabled increases in information about
environmentally significant individual behaviors may enhance market
efforts to change those behaviors in two key ways. 10 2 First, the
information has the potential to identify, explain, and reduce errors in
the establishment of price signals or consumer responses to price
signals. It can thus help policymakers design market approaches that
will be more effective in changing individual behaviors in desired
ways. Second, this information may greatly expand the opportunities
for and feasibility of charging for the consumption of public
environmental
goods
(and establishing
associated
market
mechanisms) by making it increasingly possible and inexpensive to
10 3
track individual consumption of those goods.
Policymakers struggle to determine where price signals should
be set to achieve a desired amount of behavior change and resulting
environmental benefit. 0 4 Making those predictions may be
particularly fraught with difficulty when attempting to use price to
influence individual behavior. 10 5 Better-more accurate and more
immediate-information about how individuals are responding to a
100. Andrew Green, You Can't Pay Them Enough: Subsidies, Environmental Law, and
Social Norms, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 407, 432-33 (2006) ("If an individual obtains intrinsic
benefits from an act, or possibly sees acting from altruism as part of her self-conception, paying
her for taking the act may remove this benefit or reduce the impact of the act on her selfconception." (citation omitted)).
101. Vandenbergh, Barkenbus & Gilligan, supra note 9, at 1704 (describing studies
suggesting that behavior does not always respond to price signals); Michael P. Vandenbergh,
Amanda R. Carrico & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Regulation in the Behavioral Era, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 715, 765 (2011) (criticizing current GHG-control strategies aimed at the household sector
for "reflect[ing] strong assumptions about the influence of price and thus often overlook[ing]
other influences on behavior").
102. See generally Esty, supra note 10, at 187-88 ("To the extent that information
technologies ameliorate valuation disputes, make property rights easier to define and defend,
and generally lower transaction costs, they eliminate a number of the obstacles that have
prevented broader adoption of market-based regulatory strategies.").
103. Id. at 177 (describing how technology can enhance the "capacity to enforce limits on
exploitation of the resource by individual actors" where resources are managed as a public good).
104. Robert R. Nordhaus & Kyle W. Danish, Assessing the Options for Designing a
Mandatory U.S. Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 97, 146-49
(2005) (discussing the need to adjust GHG tax rates to achieve specified levels of emission
reductions).
105. Vandenbergh, Carrico & Bressman, supra note 101, at 735-63 (explaining a variety of
factors that influence individual responses to price signals).
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price signal can, however, help policymakers quickly identify mistakes
in pricing and make adjustments. "[R]ecently developed information
and communications technologies provide a capacity to monitor
market behavior on a real-time basis, including behavioral changes
induced by economic incentives. By tracking activity patterns,
regulators will be able to adjust tax rates to achieve optimal emissions
levels." 106 Imagine, for example, that the government wished to
promote sustainable fishing practices by taxing unsustainably caught
fish or subsidizing sustainably caught fish. It could mine grocery
records (such as online sales and sales linked to shopper discount
cards) to track whether and how a change in price is changing
individual purchasing decisions, including by ascertaining whether
individuals who previously purchased unsustainably caught fish have
switched to purchasing sustainably caught fish (or whether they are
now buying hot dogs instead). 10 7 Quick and detailed information about
how individuals respond to changed prices can, therefore, help rectify
errors in setting price signals and provide greater confidence that
price signals can achieve desired results.
Technology can also be used to provide individuals themselves
with information about the dollar costs of their behaviors and thereby
enhance efforts to use price to drive environmental behaviors. A chief
concern about relying solely or primarily on price signals to change
environmentally significant individual behaviors is that individuals
may lack information necessary to modify their behavior in desired
ways. 108 Energy pricing and energy use provide some excellent
examples. Raising the cost of energy (directly or indirectly, by
imposing constraints on energy producers or providers) should induce
individuals to reduce energy use. However, even individuals motivated
to reduce their monthly energy bill may have little concept of how to
do so, let alone how to do so efficiently (i.e., by reducing energy waste
while continuing valued behaviors):

106. Esty, supranote 10, at 189.
107. For a description of the information obtained by retail establishments, see Charles
Duhigg,
How Companies Learn Your
Secrets, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb.
16,
2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?
r=&ref=magazine. For a
critique from a privacy perspective, see Katherine Albrecht, Supermarket Cards: The Tip of the
Retail Surveillance Iceberg, 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 534, 534-39 (2002).
108. Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 9, at 1725 (discussing how individuals respond
to the price of electricity and concluding that "[ilndividuals often do not have sufficient
information to respond rationally to changes in price signals"). For an overview of a variety of
factors, including insufficient information, that shape how individuals respond to price signals,
including with respect to energy use, see Vandenbergh, Carrico & Bressman, supra note 101, at
743-50.
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[Individuals] tend to overemphasize the energy-reducing value of behaviors that have
perceptible effects, such as turning off lights, and to discount behaviors that are less
perceptible but have much greater effects on energy savings, such as improving the
efficiency of heating and cooling systems ....
One study analogized the information
available to individuals when they make home energy use decisions to a grocery store in
which no prices are listed on the products and the consumer receives a bill with only a
total amount from the cashier. 109

Public information campaigns can help educate consumers by,
for example, explaining how various appliances and gadgets can
consume energy even when not in use.1 1 ° However, technology that
reveals how a particular individual or household uses energy can offer
far more nuanced and useful information to guide individuals in how
to most painlessly reduce their energy use."' Individuals can use
smart meters, home energy management systems, and smart
appliances to display detailed information about their energy use in
readily understandable formats, track the energy use of particular
appliances, and preprogram appliances to run (or not run) at certain
times depending upon electricity prices.1 1 2 One technology proposed to
aid energy conversation is an "Ambient Orb" that would glow green
when a household's energy use is low but pulse red when energy use is
high.1 13 In this way, providing an individual with detailed information
about his or her own environmentally significant behavior can reduce
errors in the individual's response to price signals.
Better information about individual environmental behaviors
can also greatly expand the opportunities for and feasibility of
charging individuals for the consumption of public environmental
goods and establishing associated market mechanisms. 114 Technology
109. Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supranote 9, at 1725.
110. See generally Vandenbergh, Barkenbus & Gilligan, supra note 9, at 1730-35
(describing energy consumption related to standby electric use and proposing a strategy for
reducing that use including public education).
111. Quinn & Reed, supra note 16, at 870-71 (describing the benefits of smart grid data for
energy conservation).
112. E.g., Stern, supra note 9, at 146-47 (describing automated and semi-automated smart
grid functions); Patrick McDaniel & Stephen McLaughlin, Security and Privacy Challenges in the
Smart Grid, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, May-June 2009, at 75-79 (describing home energy
management systems); Keri Allan, Power to the People, ENGINEERING & TECH. MAG., Oct. 19,
2009, http://eandt.theiet.org/magazine/2009/18/power-to-the-people.cfm (describing the growing
capabilities of home energy management systems).
113. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 194 (summarizing Clive Thompson's review of
Southern California Edison's creative efforts to encourage energy conservation, including the
"Ambient Orb, a little ball that glows red when a customer is using lots of energy but green when
energy use is modest").
114. Property or liability rules could also be established for environmental goods and
applied to individuals. Vandenbergh, supranote 8, at 604 (describing property and liability rules,
how they might be applied to individual environmental harms, and the difficulties of doing so).
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is reducing "the costs of defining, protecting, and trading
environmental property rights" with respect to individuals. 115 At the
most basic level, technology enhances the ability to quantify the
environmental harms imposed by individuals and, therefore, enhances
the ability to price those harms:
Most notably, quantitative data facilitates the "pricing" of pollution and natural
resource consumption, making market-based interventions more viable. If we know how
much water a homeowner has used, it is much easier to impose usage fees. And if we
can measure the level of emissions coming out of a car's exhaust pipe, charging for the
1 16
harm becomes much easier.

A range of data about individual behaviors supports pricing the
environmental goods consumed or harmed as a result of those
behaviors. Already, EZ-Pass and other more sophisticated toll systems
increase the feasibility of operating congestion-pricing programs.11 7
(One transportation consultant predicts that smartphone technology
and the cloud infrastructure will ultimately be "so precise that you
will be able to charge people for how much of Fifth Avenue they use
and for how long a period. In Christmas season you may decide to
charge them $10 to use Fifth Avenue for each block.").118 Smart meters
and related technologies allow utility companies to track household
energy use in greater detail, which in turn allows them to charge more
for energy used during peak periods. 119
The potential for attaching prices to additional harms that
individuals inflict on the environment is even greater. Individual GHG
Although improved information about the harms individuals inflict on the environment, as well
as new opportunities for individuals to negotiate electronically, likely makes it easier to impose
some forms of property or liability rules, see Esty, supra note 10, at 175-82 (identifying how
technology and better information can support property or liability rules for environmental
goods), the obstacles to property or liability rules for individual environmental harms
nonetheless remain daunting and for this reason are not explored in greater depth. But see
Ostrander, supra note 9, at 125-33 (arguing that electronic records of purchases could be used to
impose tort liability on individual consumers for the environmental harms associated with their
consumption).
115. Esty, supranote 10, at 178.
116. Id. at 164-65.
117. Id. at 189 (observing that in Singapore "commuters pay electronically-deducted tolls
with differential charges, depending on how far into the urban center they take their cars and at
what time of day" and concluding that "the chance to tailor incentives with considerable
precision nonetheless represents a major policy opportunity"); see also John Markoff, Incentives
for Drivers Who Avoid Traffic Jams, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2012, at D1 (describing a program at
Stanford that monitors when cars enter campus and park to reward off-peak travel). The RFID
technology used to support congestion pricing was recently replaced by smartphone location
data. Id. at D4.
118. Markoff, supra note 117, at D4 (quoting Samuel I. Schwartz).
119. ELLERY E. QUEEN, EDISON ELEC. INST., SMART METERS AND SMART METER SYSTEMS: A
METERING INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE 10 (2011).
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emissions provide a good example. 120 The prospect of directly
regulating individual GHG emissions is generally dismissed as
infeasible. 121 As summarized by one scholar, rejecting as infeasible an
all-source, downstream cap-and-trade program:
Sources of C0 2 , the primary GHG, number in the hundreds of millions. The sources
include not only large facilities, such as those in the electricity generating sector, but
also households and vehicles. The administrative costs of allowance allocation,
monitoring, and enforcement for so many sources, especially the small ones, would likely
be prohibitive. 122

While a cost-effective cap-and-trade scheme incorporating all
individual emissions may yet prove too unwieldy to implement,
advances in estimating or tracking individual GHG emissions suggest
new possibilities for pricing or otherwise regulating these emissions.
Sophisticated carbon footprint calculators can generate baseline
emission values by region and estimate individual emissions by
looking to a variety of variables, including an individual's
transportation, housing, and shopping choices. 123 Services now allow
individuals to estimate the GHG emissions associated with various
activities (for example, flying) and purchase carbon credits to offset
those emissions. 124 This type of information can enable the pricing of

120. See Esty, supra note 10, at 176-77 n.214 (referencing the ability to better track
greenhouse gases as an example of how information may enhance opportunities for defining
property rights in environmental goods).
121. DEP'T FOR ENV'T, FOOD & RURAL AFFAIRS, SYNTHESIS REPORT ON THE FINDINGS FROM
DEFRA'S PRE-FEASIBILITY STUDY INTO PERSONAL CARBON TRADING 9, 15 (2008), available at
http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decce/what%20we%20do/global%20climate%20change%20and%20e
nergy/tackling%20climate%20changeind-com-actionlpersonal/pct-synthesis-report.pdf
(evaluating personal carbon trading and concluding that it is technologically feasible but
unlikely to be cost effective: 'The introduction of personal carbon trading will require a
comprehensive system to assign ownership of carbon allowances to around 50 million
participants, to track allowance usage by participants across all relevant retail points (petrol
stations, energy suppliers, travel agents etc.) and reconcile usage against their account
holdings."); Nordhaus & Danish, supra note 104, at 128 (describing the difficulties of
implementing a downstream cap-and-trade program, applicable to all sources of GHGs including
individuals). Some individuals have joined Climate Rationing Action Groups and voluntarily
assumed individual carbon quotas. Sarah Krakoff, Planetarian Identity Formation and the
Relocalization of Environmental Law, 64 FLA. L. REV. 87, 115-17 (2012) (describing Climate
Rationing Action Groups).
122. Nordhaus & Danish, supra note 104, at 128. See generally Vandenbergh, supra note 9,
at 601-02 (describing the difficulty of establishing marketable allowance schemes for individuals
as polluters more generally).
123. CoolClimate Carbon Footprint Calculator, COOLCLIMATE NETWORK, http://coolclimate
.berkeley.edulcarboncalculator (last visited Jan. 9, 2012).
124. CARBONFUND.ORG, http://www.carbonfund.org/individuals (last visited Jan. 9, 2012);
TERRAPASS, http://www.terrapass.com/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2012) (allowing individuals to
estimate their carbon footprint-including the carbon footprint of a wedding-and purchase
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individual GHG emissions. 12 5 Technology makes it easier to price
individual emissions both by rendering information about the volume
of individual emissions more accurate and accessible and by
decreasing the administrative burden posed by charging individuals
126
for those emissions.
C. Architecture
Government can also seek to influence environmentally
significant individual behaviors by regulating architecture, or
"features of the world" that constrain behavior or drive the harms
associated with that behavior. 127 Government uses law to define
architecture through zoning codes, building codes, and product
mandates with significant consequences for both behavior and the
environmental impacts of behavior. 128 In some instances, technology
shapes
or
indirectly
that
directly
architecture
provides
by
incorporating
individual
behaviors
significant
environmentally

offsets for annual energy consumption, annual home energy use, annual flights, and/or annual
car use).
125. Some companies now sponsor personal allowance carbon trading programs; employees
use an online portal to track energy use. See, e.g., Pact at WSP, WSP ENV'T & ENERGY,
http://www.wspenvironmental.com/learnaboutus/personal-carbon-tracking (last visited July 10,
2012).
126. The Internet can allow for easier negotiation between larger numbers of people,
thereby allowing for Coasian bargaining even where greater numbers of individuals are involved.
Esty, supra note 10, at 180 ("One can imagine, for example, that property developers seeking to
site a new factory may be able to negotiate electronically with the neighbors over compensation
for any associated noise or dust.").
127. See Lessig, supra note 12, at 663. One critique of architectural regulation is that it can
reduce transparency-individuals may not be aware of government regulation of their behavior.
LESSIG, supra note 46, at 95-98 (describing how architectural regulation can lead to indirection);
Lee Tien, Architectural Regulation and the Evolution of Social Norms, in CYBERCRIME 37, 38-46
(Jack M. Balkin et al. eds., 2007) ("[B]ecause architectural regulation regulates settings or
equipment in order to regulate behavior, it changes the nature of rule presentation and rule
enforcement in ways that are likely to decrease law's publicity or visibility.... To the extent that
legitimacy and public deliberation are integral to our notion of law, the surreptitious enactment
and enforcement of norms via architecture should give us pause.").
128. See CZARNEZKI, supra note 9, at 48-49, 66-68 (identifying policies that encourage
individual lifestyles and decisions that are harmful for the environment, such as highway
funding and agricultural subsidies). See generally John Turner & Jason Rylander, Land Use: The
Forgotten Agenda, in THINKING ECOLOGICALLY 60, 64 (Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds.,
1997) (describing how transportation and housing policy facilitate sprawl and associated
environmental harms). Another context in which architectural regulation can regulate behavior
is in the use of technology; computer code, for example, can regulate behavior. LESSIG, supra note
127, at 89.

1592

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:6:1565

automated or semiautomated features. 129 Smart appliances linked to
smart meter infrastructure, for example, can "receive price signals
about peak rates and remain on but automatically shift into a reduced
electricity usage or conservation mode (e.g., clothes dryer will take
longer to dry but the appliance is not cycled off entirely and the
consumer receives discounted pricing).' 3 °
Importantly, efforts to use law to define architecture in ways
that change environmentally significant individual behaviors or
reduce the harms arising from those behaviors require regulators to
assess how existing architecture shapes behaviors and generates
harms and also to predict or monitor the effects that changing
architecture has on behaviors and associated harms. 13' These
inquiries
can
prove
complex;
better
information
about
environmentally significant individual behaviors may assist in
generating accurate answers to both sets of questions. Urban planners
and land use decisionmakers now have access to a variety of
technologies-satellite map data, GIS, GPS, software-that can
illuminate community behaviors and help them design and maintain
local architecture.13 2 GIS, for example, enables urban planners and
other policymakers to link geographic information with databases to
facilitate research about a variety of community conditions.' 33 With
129. Stern, supra note 9, at 146-47 (describing how technology, in particular the use of

automated or semi-automated features, can reduce individual environmental harms).
130. Id. at 146.
131. See generally PSYCHOLOGY AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT, supra note 73, at

153-54 (describing the need to accompany green architecture with psychological insights and
observing that "[z]ero-energy buildings are now being developed and tested for their engineering
characteristics, but if they are to approach their technical potential, they need to be designed so
that occupants will not counteract the engineering, as many households now do with
programmable thermostats," and that "[t]o make new designs practical and attractive, research
is needed on people's responses to a new geography of communities").
132. Patricia E. Salkin, From Bricks and Mortar to Mega-Bytes and Mega-Pixels: The
ChangingLandscape of the Impact of Technology and Innovation on Urban Development, 42/43
URB. LAW. 11, 11-12 (2010/2011) (reviewing how different technologies assist urban planners);
see also Urban EcoMap San Francisco, CONNECTED URB. DEV., http://sf.urbanecomap.org/?
locale=en_US# (last visited June 25, 2012) (offering San Francisco residents an interactive
website that compiles detailed local environmental data and encourages voluntary action).
Connected Urban Development is an initiative that is helping localities deploy information and
communications technology to reduce emissions. Urban EcoMap: An Innovative Connected and
Sustainable Cities Pilot by the Cisco Internet Business Solutions Group (IBSG) and the City and
County of San Francisco, CONNECTED URBAN DEV., http://www.cisco.comlweb/about/ac79/docs
urbanecomap/factsheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2012).
133. Salkin, supra note 132, at 19 ("GIS has also been used for such diverse planning
research as measuring crime rates in the vicinity of public housing developments, determining
the location of 'food deserts,' and analyzing the effects of Census counts of prisoners on legislative
redistricting and vote dilution." (citations omitted)).
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respect to product mandates that set minimum standards of energy
efficiency, the "rebound effect" presents a potential difficulty to
predicting the effect of changing architecture. 134 Namely, when a
product is more energy efficient, individuals may change their
behavior to use the product more (for example, drive more when a car
uses less gas) thereby reducing, nullifying, or even overwhelming any
potential energy-saving gains. 135 Technology may provide ways to
more readily track the response to changes in architecture, thereby
allowing regulators to make adjustments that enhance environmental
gains or avoid unintended environmental harms. With respect to the
rebound effect, for example, smart meters can now track the energy
use of some individual appliances. 136 Data could be compiled about the
frequency of use of each appliance, and an increase in frequency of
use, perhaps signaling a rebound effect, could be speedily detected.
Thus, better information about environmentally significant behaviors
can guide architecture reform to better achieve environmental
protection.
D. Mandates
Government could also use law to directly impose requirements
on environmentally significant individual behaviors and sanction
noncompliance. 137 Mandates receive relatively little attention as a
potential tool for changing environmentally significant individual
behaviors primarily because enforcing mandates against millions of
individuals would be costly, present administrative challenges
(particularly where behaviors occur in private), and risk backlash if
the public perceives enforcement as overly intrusive. 3 8 Moreover, it
can prove difficult to generate political and public support for
environmental mandates directed at individual behavior, as the costs
that mandates impose on individuals-whether those costs are
monetary or otherwise (inconvenience)-are generally readily

134. Nordhaus & Danish, supra note 121, at 157 (describing the rebound effect);
Vandenbergh, Carrico & Bressman, supra note 101, at 738-39 (warning against overreliance on
price and technology to reduce individual energy use in light of the rebound effect).
135. Nordhaus & Danish, supra note 121, at 157 n.229 (referencing studies showing that a

ten percent increase in fuel efficiency may lead to a one percent to two percent increase in vehicle
miles traveled).
136. Allan, supra note 112.
137. Lessig, supra note 12, at 664.
138. For an overview of the difficulties of applying mandates to individuals, see
Vandenbergh, supra note 8, at 554-56, 597-600.
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acknowledged. 139 Technology that enables more ready access to
personal environmental information could: (1) expand the range of
environmentally significant individual behaviors potentially subject to
the application of a mandate by allowing for the identification of
individual behaviors and associated harms; and (2) reduce the
administrative burdens associated with identifying and sanctioning
environmentally significant individual behaviors. As discussed infra,
however, obtaining personal environmental information and using
that information to impose mandates may engender privacy and
related intrusion objections. Realizing the potential gains from
personal environmental information without triggering new obstacles
will thus require policymakers to tread carefully, particularly with
respect to the imposition of mandates.
New technological capabilities render the application of
mandates increasingly feasible with respect to many environmentally
significant behaviors long viewed as beyond the scope of (feasible, costeffective) controls. Behavior cannot be sanctioned and therefore
cannot be the subject of an enforceable mandate if it cannot be
identified or monitored. Additionally, the imposition of sanctions
quickly becomes cost prohibitive where, as in the case of individuals,
the objects of regulation number in the millions. Technology
and
monitoring of
increasingly
enables the identification
behaviors
in
cost-effective
environmentally significant individual
14
0
ways;
it also enables cost-effective enforcement by allowing for the
easy storage and manipulation of data. In the context of fisheries, for
example, technology now makes it increasingly feasible to impose and
enforce quotas on individual vessels:
In combination with remote sensing, GPS and GIS technologies have the potential to
improve the management of various open-access natural resources that are difficult to
police.... To return to the problem of fisheries management, quotas can be allocated
and enforced using satellite tracking to observe and even measure the number of fish
being taken by particular vessels. And while the prospect of keeping track of hundreds
or even thousands of fishing boats might have seemed daunting a few years ago, today's
computers can manage the task with relative ease. In fact, New Zealand's fisheries
recently have been revived under a tradable quota regime reinforced by a sophisticated
electronic tracking system. 141

139. Kuh, supra note 9, at 1181 (discussing how mandates reveal the costs of compliance for
individuals while indirect regulation can obscure the costs that a regulatory measure imposes on
individuals).
140. One program, See Click Fix, "allows people to report potholes, graffiti, and crime by
uploading photos from their mobile phones. Locational information is automatically attached to
the images, and local governments that team with the company receive the information directly."
Salkin, supranote 132, at 22-23 (citation omitted).
141. Esty, supra note 10, at 177.
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Advances in GPS, GIS, and remote-sensing technologies permit
the monitoring of the catch of specific vessels and coordinating a quota
system across large fleets. Household recycling behavior provides
another good example of how technology can facilitate the use of
mandates. Some local governments now use RFID chips embedded in
recycling collection bins to help track household recycling behaviors
(including everything from whether the household is recycling at all to
whether its members properly separate their recyclables).1 42 RFID and
related software make it easier to track the recycling behavior of
individual households:
[T]he system enables the driver to communicate any issues with a particular
household's recycling. The software presents a number of prompts on the CV30's touch
screen, which the driver can use to note, for example, that the cart was placed
backwards at the curb, or contained a large percentage of non-recyclable contaminants.
The software then associates the issues with the cart ID and account information and
forwards this data to the main database. Armed with this data, [the waste company or
municipality] can reach out to repeat offenders and ask them to remedy the problem(s).
And because the software tracks each and every cart 1collection,
the county has been able
43
to keep accurate records of each household's activity.

Although in the example described above, the county used the
collected data simply to educate households, 144 the data could also be
used in support of a system of levying fines for failing to separate
recyclables or otherwise comply with relevant requirements.
III. THE PERILS OF PERSONAL ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION:
PRIVACY HARMS
Part II identified some of the potential benefits of harnessing
new technology to support the regulation of individual environmental
behaviors. Part III focuses on a potential difficulty posed by exploiting
new technological capabilities to reveal or use personal environmental
information-the privacy harms that using these technologies can
occasion-and undertakes an initial effort to identify and evaluate
these privacy harms. The purpose of doing so is twofold. First, privacy
harms arising from access to and use of personal environmental
information will likely result in the imposition of privacy-based limits
on that access and use, thereby limiting, in turn, how that information
can be used to support regulation. Recognizing the privacy harms and,
142. O'Connor, supra note 3 (describing the use of RFID tags in Charleston County, South
Carolina).
143. Id.
144. Id. ("The county used this information in an education campaign in which it sent
thank-you postcards to consistent recyclers and educational postcards to recycling laggards.").
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as developed further in Part IV, the actual or likely privacy-based
limits is thus important for presenting a fair assessment of the
potential regulatory possibilities for and regulatory value of access to
personal environmental information. Second, an identification and (at
least preliminary) assessment of the privacy harms associated with
the collection and use of personal environmental information may help
in the development of privacy limits that achieve an optimal balance
between the regulatory benefits of access to personal environmental
information and privacy.
The development of appropriate privacy protections requires
policymakers and courts to "balance privacy against countervailing
interests," 145 meaning balance the privacy harms imposed by a
proposed regulation or the use of technology against the benefits of
regulating (using technology) in that manner. The analysis in Part II
is a first attempt to articulate one such countervailing interest by
describing a benefit, namely how technology-aided identification of
personal environmental harms can be used to help reduce those
harms. Some value derives simply from pointing out this potential
benefit. This is so because awareness of the potential value of such
information can prevent the inadvertent loss of access to personal
environmental information in the development of privacy policies
where the information can be obtained without incurring privacy
harms or where privacy harms are generally recognized as
inconsequential. Defining the benefit of personal environmental
information will also prove useful where obtaining personal
environmental information imposes a more significant privacy harm,
and the question becomes whether the benefit of the obtained
information justifies imposition of that privacy harm.
Although it is perhaps more centrally the purview of privacy
scholars, environmental scholars can help to conceptualize the privacy
harm(s) that the benefit of developing personal environmental
information is being weighed against. First, the content of the
information collected, the method of information collection, and the
use and disclosure of the information define the nature and extent of

145. Solove, supra note 35, at 483-84 (developing a taxonomy of privacy in part to assist in
such balancing); see also Westin, supra note 20, at 1205-06 (proposing criteria to balance privacy
and competing values in the face of new surveillance technology and observing that "achieving
and maintaining a balance among the values of privacy, disclosure, and surveillance is a subtle
and complicated process in every society. This is especially true in a free society seeking both
liberty and stability, as well as scientific progress.").
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any resulting privacy harm(s). 146 What information is collected? How?
By whom? For what purpose? By identifying the type of personal
environmental information needed to support policy objectives (which
in turn dictates the technologies and regulation needed to obtain that
information), environmental scholars can help bring into focus the
privacy harms associated with obtaining that type of information.
Section IIl.A identifies the potential privacy harms associated with
some of the methods of generating and using personal environmental
information described in Part II.
Second, environmental scholars can help to theorize
environmental privacy more generally. For example, what rationales
support recognizing privacy in personal environmental information?
Are the rationales for respecting privacy weakened when an
individual's actions impose externalities on others? When privacy and
environmental externalities intersect, how does this shape our
understanding of privacy harms? An effort to develop a theory of
environmental privacy is beyond the scope of this Article, 147 but
Section III.B undertakes an initial effort to frame some of the
questions relevant to this larger project.
A. Identifying Privacy Harms
Extensive literatures chronicle and debate both the definition
of privacy and the ways in which new technologies diminish or
reshape conceptions of privacy. 148 Privacy harms that are legally
cognizable (under constitutions, the common law, or statute) are a
much smaller subset of the larger universe of privacy harms

146. Solove, supra note 35, at 485 ("The question of when and how the law should regulate
[to protect privacy] can only be answered in each specific context in which the question arises.").
147. Scholars have previously analyzed privacy and environmental law in a variety of
contexts but not with the purpose of developing a general theory of environmental privacy or
evaluating privacy protections for environmentally significant individual behaviors. E.g., Dennis
D. Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment: What Privacy Regulation Can Learn from
Environmental Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1, 4, 7-11 (2006) (analyzing how environmental law and
policy can provide a model for privacy regulation after the Information Revolution).
148. E.g., LESSIG, supra note 127, at 142-56 (describing three conceptions of privacyminimization of intrusion, protection of dignity, and substantive constraint on the power to
regulate-and identifying two "distinct threats to the values of privacy" posed by technology: "
'efficient invasion': technologies now enable searching with none of the burdens that searches
ordinarily entailed" and "monitoring, and the control over data that monitoring produces"); ADAM
D. MOORE, PRIVACY RIGHTS: MORAL AND LEGAL FOUNDATIONS 11-32 (2010) (describing and

evaluating different definitions of privacy); SOLOVE, supra note 20, at 131-32.
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recognized by scholars and other commentators. 149 For present
purposes, it is useful to focus on this latter, broader conception of
privacy harms to identify the harms potentially resulting from
employing new technologies to regulate environmentally significant
individual behaviors. All types of privacy harms may be relevant to
policymakers, courts, and citizens when weighing the benefits of using
technology to generate personal environmental information against
the privacy costs.
The collection and use of personal environmental information
to regulate environmentally significant individual behaviors could
impact a number of privacy interests. In his article, A Taxonomy of
Privacy, Daniel J. Solove identifies and explains "privacy harms and
problems that have achieved a significant degree of social recognition,"
with attention to privacy harms associated with new technological
capabilities.' 5 0 The following sections provide a short summary of
select privacy interests adapted from Solove's categories of privacy
harms,' 51 accompanied by specific examples of how regulation of
environmentally significant individual behaviors could implicate those
privacy interests.
Information Collection

52

Surveillance: Monitoring individuals as through visual or audio
surveillance or electronic tracking.153 Example: A city imposes
congestion pricing that is enforced primarily through the issuance of
RFID tags that record the location of an individual's car at toll
locations.
Interrogation: Requesting information from individuals, even
through seemingly benign questionnaires or standardized forms,
where there is some onus or pressure to respond. 154 Example: A

149. E.g., Solove, supra note 35, at 483 (explaining that his taxonomy of privacy harms does
not simply "catalog existing laws," but "attempt[s] to understand various privacy harms and
problems that have achieved a significant degree of social recognition").
150. Id. at 484.
151. The list includes only those privacy interests most likely to be impacted through the
regulation of environmentally significant individual behaviors. Additionally, although the
present use of each term largely tracks the definition offered in Solove's taxonomy, they are
paraphrased, shortened, and edited to accommodate this Article's focus.
152. Notably, in addition to identifying and describing different privacy harms, Solove
groups those harms into four categories: information collection, information processing,
information dissemination, and invasions. Solove, supra note 35, at 490 fig.1.
153. Id. at 491-99.
154. Id. at 499-505.
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government survey designed to estimate an individual's GHG
emissions for preparationof Individual CarbonRelease inventories.
Information Processing
Identification: Linking information about an individual to that
person. 15 5 Example: Reviewing smart meter data to characterize an
individual's energy use, perhaps for the purpose of comparing the
individual's energy use to that of others or educating that individual
about the potential for energy savings.
Insecurity: Collecting information about an individual that
exposes that person to the risk that the information will be
misappropriated, as through identity theft. 156 Example: Using RFID
tags and associated software to generate electronic records about
household waste and recycling behaviors.
Secondary use: Collecting information from an individual for
one purpose and then using the information for another purpose
without the individual's consent. 157 Example: Government reviews
smart meter data to monitor consumer responses to product energy
efficiency mandates.
Information Dissemination
158
Disclosure: Revealing true information about an individual.
Example: An entity with access to household energy use data, such as
the provider of software for a home energy monitor, sells that data to a
marketing firm.
Increased accessibility: Nonprivate (public) information is
made more accessible to others, usually by making it available in
electronic form. 159 Example: An entity compiles publicly available data
to generate estimated energy efficiency scores for homes that can be
60
viewed on the web using the home's address.1

155. Id. at 510-15.
156. Id. at 515-20.
157. Id. at 518-20.
158. Id. at 527-32.
159. Id. at 536-38.
160. Although now discontinued, Microsoft Hohm, a web-based energy management tool,
performed this function:
Based on the location of a home, we can determine numerous averages including when
the year a house was built, the type of heating system, and general appliance data....
We calculate an estimate for your home's energy use based on public data about your
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Invasion
Intrusion: Invasion of solitude, frequently as a result of
information-gathering
activities. 16 1 Example: Installation and
operation of smart meters.
Decisional interference: Individuals' awareness of government
knowledge of their behavior influences personal decisions. 162 Example:
Government uses grocery store convenience card data to monitor the
impacts of a tax on unsustainablycaught fish.
These examples illustrate how different means of obtaining
personal environmental information may occasion a range of privacy
harms. It is also useful to recognize and further explain some factors
that may exacerbate (government access to information) or mitigate
(consent by the observed party) certain privacy harms and that are
particularly salient for assessing the privacy harms arising from the
collection and use of personal environmental information in support of
regulation.
The present focus is on assessing how personal environmental
information can be obtained and used to support the regulation of
environmentally significant individual behaviors. As such, some
government involvement in the collection or use of the information is
usually anticipated. Moreover, even where government access to
information is not intended, the creation of new types of personal
environmental information nonetheless creates the risk of government
access to that information. 163 The collection and use of personal
information by the government is generally recognized to pose a threat

home's age, size, and structure, as well as information specific to your area, such as
local weather data and common roofing materials.
(last
See MICROsoFT HOHM, http://www.microsoft-hohm.comi/Info/Help.aspx?faq=categories
visited Apr. 17, 2012). Average or estimated energy efficiency scores were public. Once
individuals joined Microsoft Hohm, they could enter specific data about their home and energy
use to make the energy efficiency "Hohm Score" more accurate. Id. They could also elect to make
their home profile public. Id.
161. Solove, supra note 35, at 548-53.
162. Id. at 553-58. Notably, Solove describes decisional interference as arising with respect
to "those aspects of life which are socially considered to be the most private," such as decisions
about "home, family, and body." Id. at 555. I use the term in a broader fashion to encompass less
sensitive matters (such as consumption decisions).
163. See infra notes 180, 266, 271, 277, 281 and accompanying text (describing warrantless
government access to third party records).
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to liberty and occasions heightened and distinct privacy concerns. 16 4
As one scholar laments, "[r]ecords of personal information ...can be
used for whatever task is at hand-a tool available to anyone in power
in government for use to further the current passion or whim of the
day."'165 Government collection and use of information about
individuals poses dangers independent of the ultimate propriety of the
use for which such information is initially obtained:
The increasing amount of personal information flowing to the government poses
significant problems with far-reaching social effects. Inadequately constrained
government information-gathering can lead to at least three types of harms. First, it can
result in the slow creep toward a totalitarian state. Second, it can chill democratic
activities and interfere with individual self-determination. Third, it can lead to the
danger of harms arising in bureaucratic settings. Individuals, especially in times
of
16 6
crisis, are vulnerable to abuse from government misuse of personal information.

As testament to the special concerns associated with
government access to personal information, core statutory privacy
protections focus on limiting or conditioning government access to and
use of personal information. 167 Of course, the harms referenced above
inhere in the government's collection of or access to personal
information for any purpose, and the government already possesses a
wealth of personal information about individuals. 168 That personal
environmental information, like many other kinds of information,
would often, by design or in effect, flow to the government should not

164. MOORE, supra note 148, at 88 (observing that "[k]eeping records of citizens has been,
and continues to be, a way for governments to maintain control over their populations" and using
the example of Chinese dangan (files) to illustrate the risk of control created by the disclosure of
personal information); Schwartz, supra note 24, at 1633 ("From the earliest days of the Republic,
American law has viewed the government as the entity whose data use raises the greatest threat
to individual liberty." (citing PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW: A
STUDY OF UNITED STATES DATA PROTECTION 6 (1996))).
165. Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 20, at 1193; see also Balkin, supra note 30, at 16
("If data mining can help us locate terrorists, why not use it to find deadbeat dads, or even people
who have not paid their parking tickets?").
166. Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 20, at 1084-85 (internal references and
citations omitted); see also Westin, supra note 20, at 1019-20, 1044 (describing the importance
and role of privacy in a democratic society and observing that "one of the central elements of the
history of liberty in Western societies since the days of the Greek city-state has been the struggle
to install limits on the power of economic, political, and religious authorities to place individuals
and private groups under surveillance against their will').
167. E.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006) (placing limits on the collection, use,
and disclosure of personal information by federal agencies); Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511-20, 2701-07 (2006) (imposing limits on the government's
unauthorized collection of information from modern forms of communication).
168. Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 20, at 1142-49, 1151-52 (describing public
record-keeping and government access to personal information through the purchase of public
record collections from private companies).
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necessarily prevent its collection and use. For present purposes, what
is important is that the potential pathologies of government access to
personal information are mitigated where possible 169 and otherwise
accounted for when evaluating the gravity of the privacy harms
associated with the collection and use of personal environmental
information.
Another important consideration when evaluating the gravity
of the privacy harms associated with the collection and use of personal
environmental information is how those harms might be avoided or
mitigated, in particular by obtaining consent.170 Obtaining an
individual's consent can in some circumstances significantly mitigate
the privacy harms associated with the collection and use of
information.17 1 Consent cannot, however, eliminate the privacy harms
associated with the collection and use of personal environmental
information. This is so because it will not be feasible to obtain consent
in some circumstances without undermining regulatory aims; for
consent to be meaningful, the procedures for obtaining it must be
carefully designed; 172 and, even if consent is properly obtained,
169. Notably, the Privacy Act of 1974 incorporates Fair Information Practices and places
some constraints on the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information by federal
agencies, requiring, for example, that they collect only information that is "relevant and
necessary" for achieving authorized purposes and disclose records only with written consent. 5
U.S.C. § 552a(b), (e). Many have, however, criticized these constraints as inadequate. E.g.,
Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 20, at 1167-68 (describing how agencies can disclose
information pursuant to the Act's "routine use" exception).
170. Fair Information Practices have been developed for reducing or eliminating privacy
harms; one such practice is to obtain an individual's consent, where practicable, for the
collection, use, or dissemination of information. ROBERT GELLMAN, FAIR INFORMATION
PRACTICES: A BASIC HISTORY (2012), available at http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rgFIPShistory.pdf (reviewing the development and describing the content of various articulations
of Fair Information Practices). Consent is likely to be of particular import with respect to
limiting the privacy harms associated with the collection and use of personal environmental
information.
171. Professor Westin offered the following comments regarding the role of consent in
defining and protecting privacy:
Privacy means, in part, that individuals and organizations are usually permitted to
determine for themselves what they want to keep private and what they want-or
need-to reveal .... Data given to life insurance companies, credit agencies, survey
researchers, or government regulatory and welfare agencies ought not be shared, in
ways that identify the particular individual, without notice of the additional use and
consent to it. Unless this principle of consent is understood and accepted as the first
principle for controlling information flow in a data-stream society, serious problems of
privacy will arise in the future.
Westin, supra note 20, at 1210-12.
172. E.g., Cate, supra note 37, at 1771-78 (providing an overview of the limitations of
consent, or choice, procedures and critiquing choice approaches to privacy protection in the
context of health information); Schwartz, supra note 24, at 1661-62 (critiquing the
protectiveness of consent procedures in cyberspace).
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consent cannot avoid some privacy harms. 173 Consent and other
practices for reducing privacy harms, while not a panacea, should be
considered when designing policies for the collection and use of
personal environmental information and, as with other similar
practices, employed where possible to reduce privacy harms.
Serious efforts to regulate environmentally significant
behaviors would benefit enormously from the input of personal
environmental information; however, securing access to that
information will, as the forgoing illustrates, necessarily require the
navigation of a variety of privacy concerns. More detailed attention to
the privacy harms associated with particular proposals for or methods
of obtaining and using personal environmental information can guide
the design of policies for obtaining and using such information (to
minimize privacy harms where possible). Where privacy harms are
unavoidable, close attention to those harms can inform consideration
of and debate about balancing them with the benefits of personal
environmental information.
B. Environmental Privacy
Identifying the types of privacy harms associated with the
collection and use of personal environmental information does not,
standing alone, suggest how those harms should be valued. The
existing privacy literature houses rich accounts of the different
interests in privacy and how the harms described above affect those
interests, which can guide judgments about the value, or severity, of a
privacy harm. 174 Surveillance, for example, can "create feelings of
anxiety and discomfort," "lead to self-censorship and inhibition," and
"adversely impact freedom, creativity, and self-development.' 17 As
173. For example, even when information is obtained with an individual's consent, the
information may remain vulnerable to misuse (insecurity).
174. Inadequate privacy protections may, for example, undermine civil society by
discouraging individuals from contributing to the common good. James P. Nefh, Recognizing the
Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1, 1-8 (2003); Schwartz, supra note 24,
at 1658-66 (describing constitutive privacy in the context of information use in cyberspace). With
respect to individuals, inadequate privacy protections can occasion a range of dignitary and
"architectural" harms that create, for example, the risk of identity theft. Solove, supra note 35, at
487-88 (defining and describing architectural harms to individuals); Westin, supra note 20, at
1022-31 (describing the "functions privacy performs for individuals in democratic societies").
175. Solove, supra note 35, at 493-94; see also MOORE, stpra note 148, at 56 ("Having the
ability and moral authority to regulate access to and uses of locations and personal information
is an essential part of human flourishing and well-being. The forms of privacy may be culturally
relative, but the need for privacy is not."); Westin, supra note 20, at 1044-47 (explaining
surveillance as a means of social control and describing its effects).
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explained above, government access to information presents special
concerns. 176 The existing privacy literature provides substantial
guidance for evaluating the gravity of particular types of privacy
harms. However, a significant variable potentially useful for weighing
the privacy harms associated with the collection and use of personal
environmental information remains undertheorized-whether and
how the value of privacy in personal environmental information differs
from the value of privacy in other types of personal information.
Although development of a theory of environmental privacy is beyond
the scope of this Article, some initial thoughts follow and reveal the
complexity of the inquiry. Some rationales that on first blush appear
to support affording less stringent privacy protection to personal
environmental information-environmental externalities imposed by
individuals are in some sense public, impose harms on others, and do
not constitute sensitive personal information-are less than satisfying
upon closer reflection.
The secrecy paradigm, an oft-criticized but frequently used
principle for recognizing and evaluating privacy harms (in particular
under the common law), suggests that personal environmental
information may warrant less stringent privacy protection than other
types of personal information.177 The secrecy paradigm indexes
privacy protection to the extent to which information has been kept
private (away from public revelation).17 8 Under the Fourth
Amendment, the government does not need a warrant to search an
individual's garbage,1 79 and, as described infra, the government does
not need a warrant to obtain information provided by individuals to
third parties.1 8 0 Environmental externalities 1 8 ' imposed by individuals
arguably fall within the heartland of information traditionally
176. See supra notes 20, 30, 148-62 and accompanying text (discussing the special concerns
posed by government access to personal information).
177. Daniel J. Solove coined the term "secrecy paradigm" to describe a traditional approach
of defining privacy as conditioned on secrecy, reflected in a variety of Fourth Amendment and
tort doctrines. SOLOvE, supra note 20, at 42-44 ("Traditionally, privacy problems have been
understood as invasions into one's hidden world. Privacy is about concealment, and it is invaded
by watching and by public disclosure of confidential information.').
178. Id.; see also Solove, supra note 35, at 496-99 (critiquing the secrecy paradigm's failure
to recognize privacy harms arising from surveillance in public spaces).
179. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 35 (1988) (upholding warrantless searches of
garbage).
180. See infra notes 271-72 and accompanying text (explaining the third party doctrine).
181. A (negative) environmental externality is simply a harm to the environment that an
individual inflicts but does not pay for. For a more nuanced exploration of the definition of
environmental externalities, see Ezra Rosser, Offsetting and the Consumption of Social
Responsibility, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 27, 32-33 (2011).
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understood to be public under the secrecy paradigm. Just like garbage,
emissions or other externalities released by individuals directly into
the environment are in some sense exposed to others and therefore not
secret. Thus, with respect to many ways that individuals harm the
environment, claims to privacy as to, for example, the identity of the
emitter or the volume or substance of emissions released, are arguably
weak because, by definition, an externality is in some way public and
not secret.
However, a number of further considerations complicate
reliance on the secrecy paradigm to justify limiting privacy protections
for personal environmental information. First, as described infra,
many scholars and some courts criticize the secrecy paradigm for
failing to adequately protect significant privacy interests, particularly
in light of technological advance. 182 Additionally, the secrecy paradigm
does not map neatly onto some means of obtaining personal
environmental information. Technology may, for example, make
previously invisible externalities visible, such as remote sensors that
analyze tailpipe emissions from passing cars.18 3 When individuals
release substances into the environment that are only visible using
18 4
specialized equipment are those releases public or private?
Moreover, in many circumstances, identifying the environmental
externalities imposed by an individual may require tracking behavior
from which the externality can be extrapolated. For example,
individuals indirectly impose many environmental externalities (such
as GHG emissions) through their consumption of goods and services
(such as energy).18 5 To identify these indirect externalities, regulators
182. See infra notes 264, 278-80 and accompanying text (describing critiques of the third
party doctrine and the secrecy paradigm).
183. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 420-F-92-017, REMOTE SENSING: A SUPPLEMENTAL
TOOL FOR VEHICLE EMISSION CONTROL 1 (1993) ("Remote sensing is a way to measure pollutant
levels in a vehicle's exhaust while the vehicle is traveling down the road.").
184. Perceptions of the visibility of information can shape expectations of privacy. See Kyllo
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding the use of a thermal-imaging device to detect
heat patterns within a home constituted a Fourth Amendment search requiring a warrant).
185. For an overview of the environmental impacts of consumption, see Salzman, supra note
9, at 1249-51 ("In regard to the environmental impacts of commercial energy consumption, for
example, the average African family would need to bear more than ninety children to equal the
impact of an American couple with only two children." (citation omitted)). See also Albert C. Lin,
Virtual Consumption: A Second Life for Earth?, 2008 BYU L. REV. 47, 53-61 (2008) (describing
the environmental impacts of consumption). For a nuanced analysis of the consumer's
contribution to the environmental harms occasioned by the production of consumer goods, see
Rosser, supra note 181, at 36-41 ("Consumers do not merely buy the end product; they also have
indirect ownership over the process that created the product. If all I do is buy a pair of shoes
produced through exploitation of workers or destruction of the environment, I am participating
in the harm.").
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must extrapolate environmental harm from individual consumption.186
While consumption is often public, the environmental externalities
associated with consumption are frequently invisible.'8 7 Thus, it is not
immediately clear whether individual environmental externalities fall
within the scope of the secrecy paradigm; moreover, the justifications
for using the secrecy paradigm to define privacy protections are
88
increasingly questioned.
Another rationale for limiting the privacy afforded to personal
environmental information stems from the fact that such information
usually identifies externalities (direct or indirect) imposed by
individuals on others. Even where claims to privacy are strong
because of the context (for example, the conduct occurs in a private
home) l8 9 or the sensitivity of the information involved (for example,
personal medical information' 90 ), privacy interests may be
subordinated where an activity harms another or divulgence of
information is necessary to avoid harms to others. 19' When
186. The meaning and significance of consumption to individuals is complex and disputed.
See Lin, Virtual Consumption, supra note 185, at 62-73 (explaining different theories of
consumption).
187. See generally Kysar, supra note 88, at 536-37 (describing American consumers'
"institutionalized ignorance" about the production processes of products they consume).
188. E.g., MOORE, supra note 148, at 19-20 (criticizing definitions of privacy resting on a
public/private distinction because of technology's ability to publicize previously private
behaviors). "[Tihe availability of information is dependent upon technology. Telescopes, listening
devices, heat-imaging sensors, and the like open up what most would consider private domains
for public consumption. What we are worried about is what should be considered a 'private
affair'-something that is no one else's business." Id. (emphasis in original).
189. Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth
Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 912-20 (2010) (describing and critiquing heightened
privacy protections afforded within the physical home).
190. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83-84, 84 n.21 (2001) (distinguishing
roadblock seizures as less intrusive than body searches and holding that the unauthorized
dissemination of diagnostic test results constitutes an unreasonable search).
191. Compare Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109-11 (1990) (upholding an Ohio law
forbidding the possession and viewing of child pornography because it was "enacted ...to protect
the victims of child pornography; it hopes to destroy a market for the exploitative use of
children."), with Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-68 (1969) (striking down a Georgia law
forbidding the possession of obscene materials and emphasizing the privacy and sanctity of the
home). See generally Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602-04 (1977) (upholding a New York statute
requiring that the state be provided with prescriptions for certain drugs against a privacy
challenge and observing that "disclosures of private medical information ... to public health
agencies are often an essential part of modern medical practice even when the disclosure may
reflect unfavorably on the character of the patient. Requiring such disclosures to representatives
of the State having responsibility for the health of the community, does not automatically
amount to an impermissible invasion of privacy."); Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551
P.2d 334, 347-48 (Cal. 1976) (holding that therapists have a duty to reveal confidential
information about a patient where the patient presents a serious danger of violence to another
and observing that "the public policy favoring protection of the confidential character of patient-
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aggregated, individual environmental behaviors generate staggering
environmental and related human harms; 192 this perhaps suggests a
basis for limiting privacy protections for individual environmental
externalities.
However, as with the secrecy paradigm, application of this
is
not
information
environmental
to
personal
principle
straightforward. Many of the prior examples where privacy is
subordinated are distinguishable because the harm at issue is more
significant, the need for the information to prevent or redress the
harm is clearer, or the individual whose privacy is compromised plays
a more substantial or active role in creating the harm. Most harms
that individuals impose on the environment are relatively small (and
only impact others when aggregated over time or with the harms of
others), and the contribution of an individual's action to a specific
environmental or human health manifestation of harm is likely to be
difficult if not impossible to establish. Many harms that individuals
impose on the environment arise as a result of common, everyday
behaviors that may be unknown to the individual or unavoidable, and
the environmental harms that result may be widespread and may
impact the emitting individual as well. 193 Moreover, because they
frequently involve common behaviors, a decision to subordinate
privacy with respect to personal environmental information will likely
affect everyone. As such, the privacy considerations with respect to
individual environmental externalities may be more akin to those that
arise with respect to other common behaviors subject to broad
regulation that have small, incremental effects on the public good such
194
as, for example, requirements to divulge information on tax forms.
Thus, further thought is needed to discern whether or how the general
principles that support subordinating privacy with respect to harmful
externalities might apply to personal environmental information.
psychotherapist communications must yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert
danger to others. The protective privilege ends where the public peril begins."); Helena Gail
Rubinstein, If I Am Only for Myself, What Am I? A Communitarian Look at the Privacy
Stalemate, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 203, 227 (1999) ("Privacy concerns are subsumed to the
community benefit in cases of communicable disease, where notification is required by law.
Communities are notified when a sexual predator takes up residence in the area. The balance in
these cases resides with the community, not the individual." (citations omitted)).
192. See Vandenbergh, supra note 8, at 545-84 (documenting the volume of individual
contributions to a number of environmental problems).
193. See supra notes 150-62 and accompanying text (describing the nature of and challenges
for regulating environmentally significant individual behaviors).
194. See generally William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure,
93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1029-34 (1995) (describing the ways in which regulatory regimes
routinely and necessarily require access to private information to function).
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Finally, it could be claimed that personal environmental
information, as a category of information, is not particularly sensitive
or central to personal dignity, autonomy, personhood, etc., and is thus
less deserving of strong privacy protections. The volume of pollutants
in an individual's tailpipe emissions or home lawn pesticide
applications, for example, hardly seems particularly consequential.
However, while on the surface the characterization of personal
environmental information as low value (from a privacy perspective)
may have some appealing logic, this claim, too, becomes complicated
on further reflection. Even if the relevant personal environmental
information itself is not sensitive (for example, the externalities
associated with an individual's consumption), 195 the means needed to
obtain it may require divulging more sensitive information (such as
consumption choices) or using surveillance, monitoring, or other
mechanisms that independently inflict privacy harms.
The discussion above identifies some considerations that may
prove relevant to assessing the strength of claims to privacy for
personal environmental information. Developing a more robust theory
of environmental privacy will require deep engagement with privacy
theory and is beyond the scope of this Article. 196 Developing such a
theory is, however, a task that scholars should embrace. A thoughtful
theory of environmental privacy that assigns value to the types of
privacy harms most often associated with the development of personal
environmental information and critically examines rationales for
limiting or protecting the privacy of personal environmental
information would prove a useful tool as scholars and policymakers
navigate advances in technology and privacy concerns in the effort to
reduce individual environmental harms.

195. One commentator has argued that society should afford little privacy to consumption
with environmental impacts:
Privacy, especially in the domain of consumption, may have the appearance of
tangible meaning, but upon further examination, it breaks down into little more than
an empty cocoon that is a mere metamorphic remnant in the process of technological
and social evolution. . . . In sum, while technological hurdles and privacy-based
concerns will function as impediments to determining who buys what, in time we can
expect these obstacles to diminish.
Ostrander, supranote 9, at 128.
196. These preliminary thoughts may provide a useful starting point for fully engaging the
privacy literature and recognizing the complexities that exercise will present.
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How PRIVACY-DRIVEN LIMITS ON

EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES CAN CONSTRAIN THE REGULATORY
POTENTIAL OF PERSONAL ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION

This Part provides examples of existing and proposed limits on
the collection or use of personal information, motivated primarily by
efforts to protect privacy in light of technological advance, that
illustrate how such limits could constrain the use of personal
environmental information to regulate environmentally significant
individual behaviors. Specifically, privacy concerns are shaping the
deployment and use of RFID and smart meter technology.
Technological advances are also inspiring courts to consider narrowing
the scope of the third party exception to the Fourth Amendment.
These developments, surveyed below, illustrate how privacy concerns
can shape the deployment and use of new technologies-as well as
access to the information those technologies generate-impacting the
utility of those technologies for regulating environmentally significant
individual behaviors. Of note, this survey should not be taken as a
critique of the need for privacy protections generally or of the specific
privacy protections reviewed. 197 The purpose here is simply to provide
some examples of trade-offs between access to personal environmental
information to support regulation and privacy as privacy protections
are applied to new technologies. The larger goal is to help inform
optimal balancing of access to information and privacy; one aspect of
this is understanding trade-offs-how privacy protections can define
regulatory benefits.
A. Radio Frequency Identification
RFID technology may have numerous applications useful for
identifying individual environmental harms. Already, RFID facilitates

197. Indeed, many scholars and advocacy groups lament the lack of more stringent privacy
protections; the United States generally emphasizes private-p'arty self-regulation and the need to
shelter emerging technologies from unnecessary restraints. See Fred H. Cate, The Changing
Face of Privacy Protectionin the European Union and the United States, 33 IND. L. REV. 173, 232
(1999) (explaining the United States prefers individualized citizen-based information privacy
control over centralized government-based regulation); Jonathan Collins, Rep. Senators Vow to
Protect RFID, RFID J. (Mar. 10, 2005), http:(/www.rfidjournal.comarticlearticleview/144011/
(quoting the Senate Republican High Tech Task Force's intention to " 'protect exciting new
technologies from premature regulation or legislation in search of a problem. RFID holds
tremendous promise for our economy, including military logistics and commercial inventory
efficiencies, and should not be saddled prematurely with regulation.' ").
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the implementation of congestion-pricing 9 8 and recycling programs; 199
future applications may shed further light on environmentally
significant individual behaviors and thereby enable or facilitate their
regulation. 20 0 However, as advocacy groups, 20 ' scholars, 20 2 and the

198. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text (describing RFID's use in congestionpricing programs as a market mechanism for regulating environmentally significant individual
behavior).
199. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text (describing the use of RFID in recycling
collection).
200. A proposed but now-inactive bill in California would have authorized local governments
to "participate in a local traffic safety program that uses radio frequency identification (RFID)
technology in order to aid law enforcement efforts, promote environmental initiatives, including
congestion mitigation, and enhance revenue collections of unpaid fines and penalties." S.B. 767,
2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011). RFID may also support monitoring of extended-producer
responsibility policies designed to increase consumer electronics recycling. LARS THOROE ET AL.,
RFID-BASED INDIVIDUALIZATION OF EXTENDED PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY AND RECYCLING FOR

WEE (2011), available at http://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis20111O6. And RFID may be used to track
trash and shed more light on product life cycles. Jennifer E. Smith, You Can Run, But You Can't
Hide: Protecting Privacy from Radio Frequency Identification Technology, 8 N.C. J.L. & TECH.
249, 262-63 (2007) (describing "a patent entitled Radio-frequency tags for sorting post-consumer
items, which outlines a plan to compile and sell data on consumers' trash," creating the
possibility that "the entire life cycle of an item may be tracked" (internal quotation marks
omitted)). RFID is also being used to monitor and enforce parking rules, as well as "helping to
understand parking behavior, and residents' travel habits." Laura M. Ulatowski, Recent
Developments in RFID Technology: Weighing Utility Against Potential Privacy Concerns, 3 I/S
J.L. & POL'Y 623, 631-33 (2008) (describing how Hoboken officials installed RFID chips in
parking permits to aid in parking enforcement and are using the generated information for
various "good reasons," but observing that "[riesidents ... might be worried that they will lose
their anonymity" (citing Renee Boucher Ferguson, City of Hoboken Using RFID in Parking
Permits, EWEEK.COM (June 12, 2006), http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1975813,00.asp)).
RFID may also be used to support ecological labeling, allowing consumers to scan products to
learn their environmental attributes. Cutting et al., supra note 71, at 313 ("Information, such as
the carbon footprint of the product, whether it is a recycled product, precise ingredients, or
whether it is organic or sustainable in some other way, appears right on the label. Given that
radio frequency identification (RFID) technology is already here, why not encode current
information on the company and product into the chip so it can be read by the consumer?").
201. For an example of the concerns of privacy advocacy groups about RFID, see PRIVACY
RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, RFID POSITION STATEMENT OF CONSUMER PRIVACY AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES
ORGANIZATIONS
(2003),
available
at
http://www.privacyrights.orglar/
RFIDposition.htm (issued by, among others, the American Civil Liberties Union, Electronic
Frontier Foundation, and Electronic Privacy Information Center; identifying how RFID can
invade privacy and contrasting acceptable uses of RFID with uses that "[s]hould be [fllatly
[pirohibited").
202. See Laura Hildner, Defusing the Threat of RFID: ProtectingConsumer Privacy Through
Technology-Specific Legislation at the State Level, 41 HARV. C.R.-CL. L. REV. 133, 168-71 (2006)
(advocating for state RFID restrictions); Smith, supra note 200, at 257-66 (exploring the privacy
implications of RFID technology); Ulatowski, supra note 200, 627-47 (reviewing applications of
RFID technology and identifying associated privacy concerns); Stein, supra note 23, at 1, 20-22
(proposing federal regulation of RFID to protect privacy).
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public20 3 have all opined, RFID technology raises myriad privacy
concerns that are shaping the deployment of it.204 At the federal level,
arguments for restraint to allow time for the technology to develop
and for industry self-regulation have largely prevailed. 20 5 States have,
however, been quicker to impose privacy-driven constraints on the use
of RFID technology. 20 6 State limits on RFID technology include those
focused on specific uses of RFID-barring or imposing conditions on
the use of RFID in driver's licenses or other state-issued identification
20 8
documents, 20 7 barring the required implantation of an RFID device,
criminalizing the use of RFID technology to commit fraud or identity
theft 2 9-as well as more general laws prohibiting how information
203. "The most significant concerns expressed by consumers familiar with RFID related to
privacy .... Many of those consumers voiced strong opposition to having RFID devices track
their purchases and movements, with some citing as reasons for their position the potential for
increased marketing or government surveillance." FED. TRADE COMM'N, RFID: APPLICATIONS
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMERS 12-13 (2005) (reporting the results of a public survey
revealing significant public concern about how RFID can invade privacy).
204. K. MICHAEL & L. MCCATHIE, INT'L CONFERENCE ON MOBILE BUS., THE PROS AND CONS

OF RFID IN SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT 623-29 (2005), available at http://ro.uow.edu
.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1104&context=infopapers ("Privacy issues loom as one of the
biggest threats to the unbridled success of RFID. Privacy concerns have the potential to 'stop a
technology dead in its tracks.'" (citation omitted)).
205. See Hildner, supra note 202, at 167-68 (concluding that the "odds of passage are poor"
for federal RFID-specific privacy legislation); see also FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 203, at
21-23 (concluding that industry self-regulation is appropriate to address RFID-related privacy
concerns). Congress, for example, requires that state driver's licenses and identification cards
meet federal minimum requirements to be accepted for certain official purposes; one such
requirement is that licenses or identification cards include "[a] common machine-readable
technology, with defined minimum data elements." Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act
for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 202, 119
Stat. 231, 312-15. RFID would satisfy that technology requirement; see 6 C.F.R. § 37.19 (2012)
(specifying minimum technical requirements). RFID is also used to facilitate border crossings,
including in enhanced driver's licenses issued by some states. Documents Required for Travelers
Departing From or Arriving in the United States at Sea and Land Ports-of-Entry From Within
the Western Hemisphere, 73 Fed. Reg. 18,384, 18,390, 18,395 (Apr. 3, 2008).
206. The National Conference of State Legislatures has compiled a chart of state-level RFID
privacy measures. State Statutes Relating to Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) and Privacy,
NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-researchltelecom/radiofrequency-identification-rfid-privacy-laws.aspx (last visited May 15, 2012).
207. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-1206 (West 2012) ("The Office of Driver Services of the
Department of Finance and Administration shall not include an electronic chip or any type of
radio frequency identification (RFID) tag or chip in any driver's license or identification card or
enhanced security driver's license or identification card issued by the Department of Finance and
Administration.").
208. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-15-06 (West 2012) ("A person may not require that
an individual have inserted into that individual's body a microchip containing a radio frequency
identification device.").
209. E.g., NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.46515 (West 2012) ("A person shall not knowingly,
intentionally and for the purpose of committing fraud, identity theft or any other unlawful act:
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can be obtained using RFID or how RFID-obtained information can be
used. 210 Restrictions on how commercial entities can use RFID tags in
211
stores and consumer products have also been proposed.
Although state restrictions on RFID are not aimed specifically
at limiting the use of the technology to obtain personal environmental
information, some state law restrictions are broad enough to
potentially frustrate such efforts. In New Hampshire, the state and its
political subdivisions may not use RFID to determine the ownership of
a car or the identity of persons within a car "on the public ways of the
state or its political subdivisions," except in certain enumerated
circumstances. 21 2 In Rhode Island, personally identifiable information
from RFID-equipped toll devices is not considered public and can be
"released to law enforcement agencies only for: (1) toll enforcement
'213
purposes; or (2) for other purposes if accompanied by a court order.
21 4
Washington state issues RFID-equipped identification cards.
However, it is a felony to read information on another person's
identification document, except in a small number of enumerated
circumstances (including where the document is read "in the course of
a good faith security research, experimentation, or scientific inquiry
including, but not limited to, activities useful in identifying and
analyzing security flaws and vulnerabilities.").2

15

In Washington,

(a) Capture, store, or read information from the radio frequency identification document of
another person without that other person's knowledge and prior consent .... ").
210. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 236:130 (2011) (forbidding any state actor from using
RFID technology to determine a motor vehicle's ownership or the identity of its occupants); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-153-4 (West 2012) (restricting the state's use of toll payment information
obtained by RFID tags to "toll enforcement purposes" or "other purposes if accompanied by a
court order").
211. E.g., S.B. 1850, 187th Gen. Ct. § 3 (Mass. 2011) (proposing to require commercial
entities to notify consumers of RFID systems and label products using an RFID tag); Assemb. B.
1732, 214th Leg., 2010. Sess. § 2 (N.J. 2010) (proposing to require businesses using RFID tags to
notify customers, label products, and detach RFID tags upon purchase); Assemb. Bill 1033, 2011
Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011) (proposing to require notification, labeling, and the removal of RFID
tags at the point of sale; further prohibiting the aggregation of personal information and RFID
tag information, the sale of RFID-generated personal information to third parties, and the use of
RFID identification tags to identify a customer). Similar federal legislation has also been
proposed. Opt Out of ID Chips Act, H.R. 4673, 108th Cong. (2004) (as referred to the
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection).
212. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 236:130. Exceptions include where surveillance is "specifically
authorized by statute" or "undertaken for purposes of operation of the E-Z Pass system .... " §
236:130(111).
213. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-153-4.
214. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.20.202 (West 2012) (authorizing the issuance of enhanced
drivers' licenses and "identicards").
215. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.58.020 (West 2012). California imposes a similar restraint.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.79(a), (e) (West 2012) (criminalizing "intentionally remotely read[ing]
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personally identifying information from identification cards or RFIDenabled toll collection can only be released in aggregate form or "to
law enforcement agencies only for toll enforcement," for "United
States customs and border protection enforcement purposes," or
pursuant to court order. 216 Additionally, governmental and business
entities are barred from reading commercial RFID -identification
devices that they did not issue except in certain limited circumstances
(including, again, an exception for "[r]emotely reading or storing data
from a person's identification device in the course of an act of good
217
faith security research, experimentation, or scientific inquiry.").
21
8
could complicate use of
These laws, and others like them,
RFID in support of congestion pricing, to enforce speed limits or antiidling laws, or to develop better information about individual
environmental behaviors to enhance the design of policies targeted at
those behaviors. For example, in New Hampshire, a city would not be
permitted to issue parking permits equipped with RFID; Hoboken, NJ
is already using such a system to better understand and manage
parking demand. 21 9 Notably, in contrast to the experience with smart
meters, where at least some potential environmental applications are
widely recognized and privacy protections have been evaluated with
an eye to preserving those applications, the potential benefits of RFID
for regulating environmentally significant individual behaviors do not
appear to be widely recognized or taken into account in crafting RFID
privacy measures.
B. Smart Meters
Concerns about the way in which smart meters and related
advanced metering technologies may invade privacy are informing the

or attempt[ing] to remotely read a person's identification document using radio frequency
identification . . ."without that person's consent; exempting use of such information for "good
faith security research, experimentation, or scientific inquiry").
216. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.56.330 (West 2012).
217. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.300.030 (West 2012).
218. Vermont prohibits the compilation of "a database of electronically readable information
derived from" driver's licenses or other state identification cards; however, the prohibition does
not apply to the use of such a database "for . . . government purposes," and likely permits
government collection and use of personal environmental information for regulatory purposes.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 7 (West 2012); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.7 (West 2012) ("No person
or entity in this state shall use an electronic tracking device to determine the location or
movement of a person.").
219. See supra note 200 (describing Hoboken's RFID parking permit program).
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design and deployment of smart meters. 220 In contrast to RFID, at
least one potential environmental application of smart metersproviding individuals with access to their own electricity use data in
support of conservation efforts-features prominently in the
contemplation of appropriate privacy protections, 22 1 which generally
seek to preserve that core function of smart meters.2 22 Companies are
rapidly developing a variety of programs to provide energy
consumption data to individuals in an accessible, thoughtful format
that enables and incents conservation behaviors. 223 This capacity is
frequently recognized as justification for and a benefit of the
deployment of smart meters; 224 policymakers crafting privacy
protections for smart meters have recognized and largely preserved
this smart meter function, although, as shown below, privacy policies
nonetheless impose some constraints on the potential for smart meters
225
to support voluntary energy conservation.
Government access to smart meter data could also support the
regulation of environmentally significant individual behaviors by, for
example, allowing for the detection of rebound effects or, more
generally, providing detailed data about energy use behaviors to

220. E.g., NAT'L ASS'N OF REGULATORY UTIL. COMM'RS, RESOLUTION ON SMART GRID
PRINCIPLES
1-2
(2011),
available at
http://www.naruc.org/Resolutions/Resolution
%20on%20Smart%20Grid%2OPrinciples.pdf; NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., NIST IR 7628,
GUIDELINES FOR SMART GRID CYBER SECURITY: VOL. 2, PRIVACY AND THE SMART GRID 1-42
(2010), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsNISTIRs.html; NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE
UTILS. CONSUMER ADVOCATES, RES. 2009-03, SMART GRID PRINCIPLES OF THE NATIONAL
9 (2009), available at www.nasuca.
ASSOCIATION OF STATE UTILITIES CONSUMER ADVOCATES
orglarchive/2009-03%20FINAL.doc. Often these discussions center on how best to incorporate the
Fair Information Practices Principles, FED.
TRADE
COMM'N,
http://www.ftc.gov/
reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm (last visited Sept. 1, 2012), into the Smart Grid. See, e.g., NAT'L
AsS'N OF REGULATORY UTIL. COMM'RS, supra, at n.2 (using Fair Information Privacy Principles
as resource for "privacy policies").
221. QUINN, supranote 18, at v-vii.
222. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (explaining how smart meter data can
educate consumers and help achieve voluntary reductions in energy consumption).
223. Some utility providers are working with companies to incorporate that functionality
into the .base smart meter service; other companies market these programs directly to
consumers. Quinn & Reed, supra note 16, at 876-79 (describing "edge service providers who have
cropped up to manipulate and present electricity usage data at the edge of the electricity
network").
224. But see id. at 842-43 (explaining why utilities may not provide full support to such nontraditional functions of smart meter technology).
225. QUINN, supra note 18, at 9-16 (recognizing that "[t]he threshold motivation behind
smart grid deployment is to enable environmentally sensitive electricity generation, distribution,
and consumption practices"; reviewing privacy concerns; and discussing how privacy regulation
might impact the function and value of smart meters).
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inform energy conservation policies. 226 For the reasons described
above, however, government access to smart meter data presents
serious privacy concerns. 227 Interestingly, in spite of the gravity of the
privacy concerns at stake, government access to smart meter data, as
compared to access by private third parties, appears to have received
228
relatively less attention in discussions about smart meter privacy.
This raises two concerns. Although unfettered government access to
smart meter data seems unlikely and ill-advised, some government
access for environmental purposes, structured in ways to mitigate
privacy harms, could, if carefully designed, prove both useful and
feasible. Possibilities for such access could be frustrated by the
adoption of privacy policies developed without recognition of the need
to preserve or facilitate such access. More likely, however, if no or
inadequate restrictions on government access are in place, justifiable
privacy concerns could occasion a backlash resulting in overly broad
restrictions on government access that would preclude even limited
2 29
access structured with safeguards against misuse.

226. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text (describing how smart meter data could
be used to support market regulation of individual environmental behaviors by detecting
rebound effects); see also LOCAL GOV'T SUSTAINABLE ENERGY COAL, COMMENTS OF THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT SUSTAINABLE ENERGY COALITION ON PROPOSED DECISION ADOPTING PRIVACY
RULES 1-2 (2008), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/efile/CMJ136530.pdf (Pub. Utils. Comm'n
of the State of Cal. Rulemaking No. 08-12-009) (explaining the need for local government access
to smart meter data in support of greenhouse gas emission reduction programs). For a discussion
of potential statutory and constitutional restrictions on government access to smart meter data,
see infra notes 265-77 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability of warrant
requirements to smart meter data).
227. See supra notes 20, 30, 148-62 and accompanying text (describing the special privacy
concerns occasioned by government access to personal information).
228. See McNeil, supra note 18, at 202 (observing that law enforcement access to smart grid
data has "received relatively little attention" and suggesting this may be the result of a lack of
understanding of smart meter technology). Attention to government access to smart meter data
has focused largely on law enforcement use of smart meter records to detect, for example,
marijuana growing operations and whether or how such law enforcement access would be subject
to Fourth Amendment protections and/or federal statutory privacy requirements. E.g., BRANDON
J. MURRILL, EDWARD C. LIU & RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42338,
SMART METER DATA: PRIVACY AND CYBERSECURITY 7 (2012) [hereinafter CRS SMART METER
PRIVACY REPORT] (noting that "[t]he use of smart meters presents the recurring conflict between
law enforcement's need to effectively investigate and combat crime and our desire for privacy
while in our homes" and analyzing the propriety of access to smart meter data for government
investigations); McNeil, supra note 18, at 205-06.
229. Some empirical data suggests that individuals view government access to electricity
records as relatively intrusive. Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth
Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 333-36 (2008) (reporting the results of an empirical study in
which individuals ranked government conduct by level of intrusiveness; access to electricity
records was ranked eleventh out of twenty-five scenarios).
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At present, it is primarily state public utility commissions that
are developing and imposing smart meter privacy protections. 230 Some
state public utility commissions require that consumers be allowed to
"opt-out" and not use smart meter technology (in part out of deference
to customer privacy concerns);231 public utility commissions have also
adopted new privacy policies aimed specifically at smart meter
technology. 23 2 Together, these developments can affect the use of
smart meter information to regulate environmentally significant
individual behavior by (1) directly limiting the deployment of the
23 3
technology as a result of customer opt-out; (2) directly or indirectly
shaping access by environmental agencies to smart meter data; and
(3) imposing barriers to the development and use of home energy
management systems.
1. Customer Opt-Out
Many individuals express concern about the private
information that smart meter data can reveal and about access to and
use of that data. 234 Some utility customers decline, or wish to decline,
the installation of a smart meter in whole or in part to protect their
privacy. In response, some state public utility commissions have
adopted "opt-out" policies that allow customers to decline the
installation (or operation) of smart meter devices. For example, in
March 2012, the Public Utility Commission of Nevada approved an

230. This central regulatory role for public utility commissions may, itself, shape the
deployment and regulation of smart grid technology so as to reduce the generation, availability,
and usefulness of electricity use data. See Quinn & Reed, supra note 16, at 862-91
(demonstrating how utility control of smart meter information, privacy concerns, and other
decisions about the architecture of the smart grid may frustrate innovation and prevent the
emergence of an interstate data market).
231. See infra Part III.B. 1 (describing opt-out policies).
232. See infra notes 240-265 and accompanying text (describing the privacy policy adopted
by the Colorado Public Utility Commission); see also CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM'N, DECISION NO. 1107-056, DECISION ADOPTING RULES TO PROTECT THE PRIVACY AND SECURITY OF THE ELECTRICITY
USAGE DATA OF THE CUSTOMERS OF PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, AND SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY 2-5 (2011), available

at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/WORD-PDF/FINALDECISION/140369.pdf (adopting privacy rules
applicable to certain California utilities).
233. As noted above, privacy policies can directly impose limits on government access or, by
failing to impose adequate limits, invite backlash that will ultimately result in such limits.
Supra note 229 and accompanying text.
234. Some California cities, for example, imposed moratoria on the installation of smart
meters motivated in part by privacy concerns. Clearlake Bans PG&E Smart Meters, Utility
Unfazed, SMARTGRID TODAY (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.smartgridtoday.com/publicClearlake
_ban9_PG.cfm (describing a moratorium adopted by the city of Clearlake, California).
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opt-out plan that will allow objecting customers to decline smart meter
installation in favor of a digital meter that allows for drive-by
reading. 2 35 California's Public Utility Commission has approved optout plans allowing customers to choose analog meters. 236 Utility
commissions in other states have likewise adopted or are considering
adopting similar opt-out policies. 237 Customer refusal of smart meter
devices may impede the collection of personal environmental
information and associated efforts to regulate environmentally
significant individual behaviors directly by hindering the deployment
and use of smart meter technology and by preventing installation of
the technology at specific residences, and indirectly by raising the
238
costs of smart meter deployment.
2. Privacy Policies
Privacy policies adopted by state public utility commissions
may impede the use of smart meter data to regulate environmentally
significant individual behaviors by hindering the development and use
of home energy management systems or defining the terms of

235. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N OF NEV., DOCKET No. 11-10007, INVESTIGATION REGARDING NV
ENERGY'S ADVANCED SERVICE DELIVERY METER PROGRAM A/K/A SMART METER AND ITS
IMPLEMENTATION (2012) [hereinafter NEVADA OPT-OUT ORDER].
236. CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, DECISION MODIFYING PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY'S
SMARTMETER PROGRAM TO INCLUDE AN OPT-OUT OPTION, DECISION No. 12-02-014 (2012),
available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PUBLISHED/FINAL_DECISION/159342.htm. The California
Public Utilities Commission has also approved opt-out analog options for the customers of
Southern California Edison and San Diego Gas & Electric. Press Release, Cal. Pub. Util.
Comm'n, CPUC Approves Analog Meter Options for Edison and SDG&E Customers Who Do Not
Wish to Have a Wireless Smart Meter (Apr. 19, 2012) (on file with author).
237. ME. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, ORDER (PART I) (2011) (requiring that utility customers in
Maine be given the option to retain analog meters or use smart meters with the transmission
function disabled); MD. PUB. SERV. COMM'N, NOTICE OF HEARING AND OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT
ON AN "OPT-OUT" OPTION FOR SMART METERS (2012) (scheduling a "legislative-style hearing...
to address whether to require the subject utilities to offer customers an opportunity to opt out of
receiving a smart meter should they so choose").
238. The costs of providing alternate metering services to customers who opt out can be high
and can include "installation labor, meter testing labor, customer support and application
returning
processing labor, ancillary meter supplies, customer communications materials ....
system modification expenditures,
[the utility's] system to its standard configuration . .
handheld purchasing costs, meter reading costs, back-office labor costs, materials costs, and
annual hardware and software maintenance costs." NEVADA OPT-OUT ORDER, supra note 235, at
21. Notably, however, opt-out policies often allow utilities to charge customers who opt out for
the additional costs of nonstandard service. Id. at 29 ("[T]he cost of the trial opt-out tariff must
be borne by the customers who demand, for whatever reason, the tariff that results in
incremental costs to [the utility].").
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government agency access to smart meter data.2 39 Utility commission
privacy policies vary and are being updated in many states to
accommodate advanced meter deployment. 240 Colorado's policy
24
provides a useful example. '
In Colorado, customer consent has long been required for the
disclosure of personal information 242 by utilities, 243 although there are
exceptions. Utilities in Colorado are permitted to provide personal
244
information to requesting government agencies without consent.
The definition of personal information is broad, and it is not clear

239. Of note, as discussed infra note 277 (discussing the potential application of the Stored
Communication Act to utilities), federal statutory privacy protections may apply to and impose
independent constraints on the disclosure of smart meter information.
240. In Texas, for example, electric service providers are prohibited from releasing
"proprietary customer information," except in certain enumerated circumstances-which notably
do not include releasing such information to local, state, or federal agencies, except for law
enforcement agencies, consumer reporting agencies, and energy assistance agencies. 16 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 25.472(b) (2012). Propriety customer information means:
Any information compiled by an electric utility on a customer in the normal course of
providing electric service that makes possible the identification of any individual
customer by matching such information with the customer's name, address, account
number, type or classification of service, historical electricity usage, expected patterns
of use, types of facilities used in providing service, individual contract terms and
conditions, price, current charges, billing records, or any other information that the
customer has expressly requested not be disclosed. Information that is redacted or
organized in such a way as to make it impossible to identify the customer to whom the
information relates does not constitute proprietary customer information.
Id. § 25.272(c)(5).
241. California has also adopted a smart grid privacy policy. CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N,
DECISION ADOPTING RULES TO PROTECT THE PRIVACY AND SECURITY OF THE ELECTRICITY USAGE
DATA OF THE CUSTOMERS OF PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
EDISON COMPANY, AND SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, DECISION NO. 11-07-056 app. D
(2011) [hereinafter CPUC PRIVACY POLICY], available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/published/FINAL
_DECISION/140369.htm. The California Public Utilities Commission's privacy policy
implements state law. CAL. PUB. UTIL. § 8380 (West 2012) (setting forth statutory privacy
protections for energy consumption data).
242. Colorado regulations define "personal information" as follows:
'Personal information' means any individually identifiable information obtained by a
regulated entity from a customer, from which judgments can .be made regarding the
customer's character, habits, avocations, finances, occupation, general reputation,
credit, health, or any other personal characteristics. Personal information does not
include: a customer's telephone number if it is published in a current telephone
directory or is scheduled to be published in the next telephone directory; information
necessary for the billing and collection of amounts owed to a public utility or to a
provider of service using the facilities of a public utility; or Standard Industrial Code
information used for purposes of directory publishing.
4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-1:1004(u) (LexisNexis 2010).
243. Id. § 723-1:1104(a).
244. Id. § 723-1:1104(d) ("A utility may disclose personal information requested by a federal,
state, or local governmental agency including, but not limited to: the Commission; state and local
departments of social services; and federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.").
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whether smart meter data constitute personal information; however,
the regulations expressly provide that "information necessary for the
billing and collection of amounts owed to a public utility or to a
provider of service using the facilities of a public utility" is not
considered personal information. 245 Thus, if smart meters were used to
track energy use at frequencies required to impose time-of-use or
critical-load pricing, detailed information about household energy use
would be "necessary for billing" and therefore would not be personal
246
information.
New data privacy rules that regulate Colorado electric utilities
and were designed specifically to address privacy issues raised by
smart meter deployment went into effect in February of 2012.247 The
new rules establish an opt-in procedure; although subject to some
exceptions, utilities are generally prohibited from releasing customer
data unless the customer has authorized the release of the data by
submitting a consent form. 248 Utilities are authorized to "use customer
data to provide regulated utility service in the ordinary course of
business '249 and to share customer data with "contracted agents,"
provided they contract with those agents for certain privacy
protections (contracted agents may only, for example, use the
information for the purposes specified in the contract and not for any
secondary commercial purpose). 250 Utilities are also authorized to
release aggregated data reports2 51 subject to some restrictions
designed to avoid reverse engineering that would allow isolation of one
252
customer's data from the aggregated data pool.
Colorado's data privacy rules thus impose some constraints on
private, third party deployment of products to help individuals
understand and manage their home energy use using smart meter
data. With respect to private vendors, Colorado's privacy protections
impose a specific procedure-customers must complete and submit a
consent form. 253 Although not perhaps unduly burdensome, this
nonetheless presents an additional barrier to the development of
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id.
QUINN, supra note 18.
4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-3:3026-31.
Id. §§ 723-3:3026, 3028, 3030.
Id. § 723-3:3026(a).
Id. § 723-3:3029.
Id. § 723-3:3031.

252. PUB.UTIL. COMM'N OF COLO., IN RE PROPOSED RULES RELATING TO SMART GRID DATA
88 (2011), available at https://www.
PRIVACY FOR ELECTRIC UTILITIES, DECISION NO. Rll-0922

dora.state.co.us/pls/efi/efi p2_v2 demto. show -document?pdms.documentid=128569.
253. 4 COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 723-3:3028, 3030.
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technologies to support voluntary conservation behavior. 254 With
respect to vendors that a utility contracts with directly, Colorado's
rule would treat the company as a contracted agent and require that
the utility's contract with the company include certain privacy
255
protections.
The terms of government access to household energy use data
under the data privacy rules are somewhat unclear. The data privacy
rules, set forth in the Rules Regulating Electric Utilities, provide that:
"A utility shall not disclose customer data unless such disclosure
conforms to these rules, except as required by law or to comply with
the Commission rule. Illustratively, this includes responses to
requests of the Commission, warrants, subpoenas, court orders, or as
2 56
authorized by § 16-15.5-102, C.R.S."
The prior rule authorizing the release of personal information
to government agencies upon request, located in the Rules of Practice
and Procedure, has not been amended. Thus, the question is how that
rule and the new data privacy rules are meant to be interpreted
together.2 57 The authorization of the release of personal information
upon request to government agencies is a "Commission rule" for
purposes of section 3026(b), and the release of personal information
absent consent is thus presumably still allowed. 258 Thus, if smart
meter data is "personal information," it is likely still permissible for
utilities to provide that information to government agencies upon
request absent customer consent; if smart meter data is not "personal
254. Energy Lawyer Asks: Can a Data-use Consent Form Be Too Clear?, SMARTGRIDTODAY
(May
18,
2011),
http://www.smartgridtoday.com/members/Energy-lawyerasksCan_a_
datauseltbrgt-consentform_be_too_clear.cfm (describing concerns that Colorado's consent form
will dissuade consumers from using home energy management systems).
255. 4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-3:3029.
256. Id. § 723-3:3026(b).
257. The definition of "personal information" is provided in full. See supra note 242. The
regulations also define "customer data":
'Customer data' means customer-specific data or information that: (1) is collected from
the electric meter by the utility and stored in its systems (e.g., kWh, kW, voltage,
VARs and power factor); (2) is received by the utility from the customer identifying
whether they participate in regulated utility programs, such as renewable energy,
demand-side management, load management, and energy efficiency; and (3)
information other than personal information that is shown on bills issued to
customers for metered service furnished.
4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-3:3001(j). Roughly speaking, personal information appears to be
meant to refer primarily to address and similar information and customer data to energy use,
although the definitions are somewhat unclear.
258. An explanation provided in the decision adopting the final data privacy rules would
seem to support this interpretation. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N OF COLO., supra note 252, 48 (resolving
a similar potential conflict by observing that the authority to disclose personal information under
Rule 1104 is a Commission rule that authorizes the release of customer data under rule 3026(b)).
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information" and only "customer data," then disclosure would be
prohibited absent consent or a subpoena. 259 It seems likely, however,
that whatever the correct interpretation of these terms, the intent in
drafting the data privacy rules was not to allow unfettered access by
government agencies to smart meter data. 260 Thus, Colorado's new
data privacy rules likely require an environmental agency seeking to
access customer-specific smart meter data to obtain a subpoena or
consent. Notably, as in Colorado, in California, government can obtain
access to smart meter data with a subpoena or by obtaining customer
consent. Additionally, however, a governmental entity can, under the
supervision of the California Public Utilities Commission ("CPUC")
and provided that it complies with the CPUC's privacy rules, obtain
smart meter data without consent to perform "energy efficiency or
'
energy efficiency evaluation services. "261
As described above, the adaptation of smart meter technology
to accommodate privacy concerns has largely preserved individual
access to energy use data, which is widely recognized as a core benefit
of smart meter deployment. However, the ramifications of these
privacy policies for future uses of the smart grid remain to be seen. By
imposing these privacy restrictions as the architecture of the smart
grid and associated services are still being developed, utility
commissions are allowing privacy concerns to shape smart grid
functions:
Interestingly, privacy concerns in Colorado seem to have struck a nerve with regulators
that emissions reduction, utility profitability, and edge service market development
have not. As a result, many of the decisions that affect the latter issues may be
determined, for better or worse, with privacy as the dominant framework for discussion.
Indeed, the usage restrictions placed on data streams in the name of privacy protection
effects on competing business models' ability to leverage the value
could have profound
2 62
of smart grid data.

259. 4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-3:3026(b).
46 (expressing "sympathy to the
260. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N OF COLO., supra note 252,
concern" that allowing the release of customer data in response to attorney-issued subpoenas
could result in "fishing expeditions for customer data," but finding "no basis or authority ...for
the Commission to limit or modify obligations arising from a legally valid subpoena").
261. CPUC PRIVACY POLICY, supra note 241, app. D at 7 (providing that utilities may
disclose smart meter data absent consent to "a governmental entity ... [that] provid[es] energy
efficiency or energy efficiency evaluation services pursuant to an order or resolution of the
Commission"); see also id. at 2 (defining, as a "primary purpose" "for the collection, storage, use [,]
or disclosure of covered information[,]" is to "plan, implement, or evaluate demand response,
energy management, or energy efficiency programs under contract with an electrical corporation,
under contract with the Commission, or as part of a Commission authorized program conducted
by a governmental entity under the supervision of the Commission").
262. Quinn & Reed, supra note 16, at 879-80 (citation omitted); see also id. at 862-91.
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With respect to the potential regulatory value and privacy
harms of providing government access to smart meter data, utility
commissions seem less focused on this issue. By requiring a subpoena
or consent, Colorado effectively precludes government access for some,
perhaps many, regulatory purposes; 263 in California, the terms of
government access are largely left to the discretion of the CPUC,
which can approve government access without consent to promote
energy efficiency on terms it sees fit. Colorado's approach may
inadvertently frustrate government access; the impacts of California's
approach will depend upon how the CPUC exercises its authority to
permit government access absent consent.
C. FourthAmendment
A desire to protect privacy in the face of new, technologically
enhanced information-gathering capabilities may be influencing the
development of Fourth Amendment doctrine so as to inhibit
government access to information generated using those technologies.
Specifically, concerns about privacy appear to be causing courts to
question the meaning and scope of the third party doctrine; 264
limitations on the third party doctrine could significantly increase the
administrative burdens of using technology to help detect, implement,
or enforce the regulation of some environmentally significant
individual behaviors.

263. It is questionable whether the EPA or other relevant agencies possess the statutory
authority to subpoena smart meter records to promote energy efficiency programs; a consent
requirement presents administrative burdens and creates the risk of selection bias. Of note, as
discussed infra note 277 and accompanying text, apart from utility policies, government access to
smart meter data may be limited by independent statutory or constitutional constraints.
264. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("[I]t may
be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties." (citations omitted)); United States
v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 282-88 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding warrant required to obtain the content
of emails stored at third-party Internet Service Provider ("ISP")); Regberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d
828, 842-46 (11th Cir. 2010) (reviewing the caselaw and concluding that the questions involved
in discerning whether the Fourth Amendment applies when government obtains the content of
emails from a third-party ISP are "complex, difficult, and 'far-reaching' legal issues"); see also
CRS SMART METER PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 228, at 16 (discussing the reasonable
expectation of privacy in smart meter data and identifying three rationales that "might weigh
against the application of traditional third-party analysis" to smart meters: "(a) a person's
expectation of privacy while at home; (b) the breadth and granularity of private information
conveyed by smart meters; (c) the lack of a voluntary assumption of the risk or consent to release
of this data"); Strandburg, supra note 32, at 642 ("Apparently aware of the sweeping implications
of a blunderbuss approach to surveillance of digital intermediary records, these courts are
increasingly disinclined to take a simplistic and aggressive third party doctrine approach.").
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Fourth Amendment protections can apply to searches
265
conducted in support of noncriminal administrative regulations.
The inspection of a home to enforce a municipal housing code, while
an "administrative search," nonetheless requires a warrant, although
in some circumstances the showing required to obtain a warrant for
such a regulatory inspection is relaxed. 266 Instead of being required to
establish probable cause to believe that there is a violation of the code
at a particular home, the government can obtain a warrant without
any "specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling"
upon establishing that "reasonable legislative or administrative
standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect
to a particular dwelling."267 Factors relevant to deciding whether this
relaxed standard governs the issuance of a warrant include the
importance of the government interest at stake (the need for the
inspection), whether there is a "long history of judicial and public
acceptance" of the type of inspection at issue, whether the regulation
at issue could feasibly be enforced without area inspections, and the
26
extent to which the inspection invades privacy.
Some types of information gathering to support the regulation
of environmentally significant individual behaviors might thus, if
conducted by the government, require a warrant (although perhaps
obtainable upon a relaxed showing). The need to satisfy even a
weakened warrant requirement would pose an administrative burden;
in the context of regulating individuals, this burden could prove so

265. See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523 (1967)
(rejecting warrantless administrative searches); Inc. Village of Laurel Hollow v. Laverne, Inc.,
262 N.Y.S.2d 622 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965); see also Laura J. Kerrigan et al., Project: The
Decriminalization of Administrative Law Penalties, Civil Remedies, Alternatives, Policy, and
Constitutional Implications, 45 ADMIN. L. REV. 367, 397-98 (1993) ("The right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment applies to noncriminal
regulatory or administrative searches, as well as traditional criminal searches." (citations
omitted)).
266. Camara,387 U.S. at 534-38.
267. Id. at 538. William J. Stuntz has argued persuasively that many exceptions to or
relaxations of Fourth Amendment protections arise from the difficulty of valuing privacy in an
evenhanded way without rendering "a great deal of ordinary government activity.., subject to
searching judicial review" or "drastically reduc[ing]" "privacy-based restrictions on police
searches." Stuntz, supra note 194, at 1055. He explains many exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment as efforts by courts to permit relatively unimpeded information gathering necessary
for the functioning of the modern administrative/regulatory state. Id. at 1054-60.
268. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-39 (observing that there is a "relatively limited invasion of
the urban citizen's privacy" where "inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the
discovery of evidence of crime").
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great as to undermine the regulation's utility. 269 However, the
government might obtain, by request or subpoena,2 70 information from
a third party who obtained that information from the individual.
Under those circumstances, it is likely that the government would not
need to obtain a warrant under the third party doctrine. 271 The
doctrine is generally understood to provide that once an individual
shares information with a third party or exposes it to the public, he or
she no longer has an expectation of privacy subject to Fourth
272
Amendment protection with respect to that information.
Imagine, for example, that a city wished to access smart meter
data to detect violations of a water conservation ordinance that
273
restricted lawn watering to specified days, times, or durations.
Some appliances use electricity in recognizable patterns (a signature)
274
that are discernible from the records generated by smart meters.
269. See generally Stuntz, supra note 194, at 1032 (arguing that many types of regulation
would be "impossible without compelled 'suspicionless' disclosure-disclosure that precedes any
showing that the government has a strong interest in obtaining the information in this case").

270. For an overview of the use of subpoenas to obtain personal information held by third
parties, see Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 822-26
(2005).
271. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (allowing the government to install a
pen register at the telephone company to record the numbers dialed from an individual's home
without a warrant); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (holding that the
government did not need a warrant to obtain an individual's financial records from the bank
since the records contained information "voluntarily conveyed" to the bank); United States v.
Hamilton, 434 F. Supp. 2d 974, 979 (D. Or. 2006) (declining to suppress utility records released
in response to an administrative subpoena because the utility was a "third party recipient[ ] of
information" so that the government "did not need a warrant supported by probable cause to
acquire Mr. Hamilton's... power records"); see also Balough, supra note 2, at 184-85 (discussing
the application of the third party doctrine to allow warrantless access to traditional utility
records); Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 20, at 1133-38 (explaining how the third party
doctrine frequently allows warrantless access to digital information). Of note, the Supreme Court
has not ruled on the applicability of the third party doctrine with respect to digital
communication, and commentators debate the scope of the doctrine. See, e.g., Strandburg, supra
note 32, at 633-49 (critiquing what she terms the "aggressive version of the third party
doctrine").
272. E.g., Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 20, at 1133-38 ('The Court's new conception
of privacy is one of total secrecy. If any information is exposed to the public or if law enforcement
officials can view something from any public vantage point, then the Court has refused to
recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy.... [The Court has further held] that there is no
reasonable expectation in privacy for information known or exposed to third parties.").
273. Such water conservation ordinances are common, see, e.g,, EL PASO, TEX., CODE §
15.13.020 (2011) (limiting lawn watering to specified dates and times), and are likely to become
more common as an adaptive response to climate change-occasioned water shortages, Benjamin
Houston & Noah Hall, Managing Demand for Water, in THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE
CHANGE (Michael Gerrard & Katrina Fischer Kuh eds., 2012) (surveying adaptation strategies
for responding to reduced water availability, including residential water conservation measures).
274. See QUINN, supra note 18, at A-5:
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From an examination of smart meter records, it might be possible to
identify the energy use signature of automatic lawn sprinklers (a
capability that if not presently available is at least reasonably
foreseeable). 275 The city might ask for access to a utility's smart meter
records and use software to detect repeated occurrences of the lawn
sprinkler signature at forbidden times or durations at the same
address (perhaps signaling that a household has automatic sprinklers
that are set in a manner contrary to the water conservation
ordinance). Armed with a computer-generated list of addresses, the
city could then enforce the ordinance expending far fewer resources
than might otherwise be required. Under the third party doctrine,
households likely do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in

energy use data provided to the

utility; 276

2
likely not be required to obtain a warrant.

thus, the government would
77

A remarkable number of electric appliances can be identified by their load signatures,
and with impressive accuracy. Researchers have all but mastered identification of the
larger common household appliances such as water heaters, well pumps, furnace
blowers, refrigerators, and air conditioners, with recognition accuracies approaching
perfection. Ongoing work focuses now on the myriad [of] smaller electric devices
around the home such as personal computers, laser printers, and differentiating
fluorescent from energy-saving light bulbs.
(citations omitted); id. at A-8 (describing a study where researchers were able to identify the use
of specific appliances from aggregated load information and observing that "[als libraries of load
signatures expand and more research pours into similar efforts, the details extractable from
smart meter data will become richer").
275. Because smart meters typically track energy consumption in intervals at or below
fifteen minutes (as opposed to monthly readings), the information collected may allow a highly
granular depiction of intrahome activities, especially when cross-referenced with other publicly
available information. See NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., supranote 220, at 13.
276. See supra note 271 and accompanying text. Additionally, it could be argued that, third
party doctrine aside, homeowners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to
when they water their lawns. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) (holding that
despite steps taken to prevent discovery of marijuana plot within the curtilage of suspect's home,
what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even when in the home, is devoid of Fourth
Amendment protection); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176 (1984) (limiting the scope of a
Fourth Amendment search to the interior of the home, thereby allowing conviction for an illegal
grow operation discovered by police in the rear of suspect's home under the "open fields"
doctrine); cf. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236-39 (1986) (holding that aerial
photographic discovery of CAA violations do not implicate a Fourth Amendment search absent
the use of technologies that can penetrate exterior walls). But access to smart meter data would
include information about a variety of other in-home activities (when the dishwasher is run, etc.)
where the claim for an expectation of privacy is clearer. For analyses of whether the government
is required to obtain a warrant under the Fourth Amendment to obtain smart meter records
from a utility, see CRS SMART METER PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 228, at 7-22; Balough, supra
note 2, at 183--85; Lerner & Mulligan, supra note 18, at 11-25; McNeil, supra note 18, at 211-18
(arguing that the third party doctrine should be interpreted so as to prohibit warrantless
government access to smart meter data).
277. Of note, if by virtue of operating smart meter technology, the utility was considered a
provider of electronic communication service or a provider of remote computing service and other
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As various technologies cause individuals to generate and
share information with third parties, the third party doctrine may
permit warrantless access to increasing volumes of personal
information. For this and other reasons, many privacy and technology
scholars criticize the third party doctrine. 278 Some appellate courts
have declined to apply the third party doctrine with respect to the
content of digital communication.2 7 9 Most notably, in her concurrence
in United States v. Jones, Justice Sotomayor suggests that in light of
technological advance, it may be necessary to "cease[ ] to treat secrecy
as a prerequisite for privacy":
More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third
parties.... This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great
deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out
mundane tasks.... I would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to
purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to
some member of the public for 2a8 limited
0
Fourth Amendment protection.

prerequisites for application of the Stored Communications Act ("SCA") were satisfied, the Act
could impose warrant or other requirements for access to or the disclosure of smart meter data in
electronic storage. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-11 (West 2012). However, application of the SCA to
smart meter data and utilities is, at best, uncertain. CRS SMART METER PRIVACY REPORT, supra
note 228, at 24-28 (examining application of the SCA to smart meter data and concluding that
the application of the SCA is fact-specific and possibly does not extend to data that "has arrived
at the utility and resides on its servers"); Balough, supra note 2, at 180 (identifying
"uncertainties" that "make it impossible to determine whether the SCA offers any protection
from the disclosure of intimate personal data from smart meters"). State statutes, state
constitutional privacy protections, utility privacy policies, and other jurisdiction-specific
measures might also impose conditions on access to utility records. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §
37-2741A (West 2012) (setting forth requirements for the issuance of a subpoena for the
production of records of a utility). Additionally, where utility records are considered public
records, a warrant would not be required to obtain those records. CRS SMART METER PRIVACY
REPORT, supra note 228, at 11-12 ("Law enforcement might also request smart meter data under
a public records theory. It is generally accepted that public records are not accorded Fourth
Whether a person's utility records are public records differs from
Amendment protection ....
state to state." (citations omitted)).
278. E.g., SOLOVE, supra note 20, at 201-02 ("[]t is only recently that we are beginning to
The government's harvesting of
see the profound implications of the third party doctrine ....
information from the extensive dossiers being assembled with modern computer technology poses
one of the most significant threats to privacy of our times." (citation omitted)); Henderson, supra
note 77, at 50-51 (setting out four factors to guide application of the Fourth Amendment to
information provided to third parties); Strandburg, supra note 32, at 633-49 (critiquing
aggressive interpretations of the third party doctrine). But see Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the
Third-PartyDoctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 573-81 (2009) (describing functional benefits of the
third party doctrine).
279. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010).
280. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
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Justice Sotomayor's concurrence signals that she is open to
abandoning the third party doctrine, and perhaps even the secrecy
paradigm that appears to undergird it, to protect against
technologically enabled revelations about previously private
behaviors.
Additionally, in permitting warrantless access to traditional
utility records under state law, some state courts have emphasized
that the obtained electric records do not reveal information about
activities within the home. 281 For example, in State v. Kuss, an Idaho
court upheld warrantless access to an individual's utility records,
reasoning:
The power records in the case at bar reveal only the amount of power usage. The power
records were maintained by WWP [the utility company] in the ordinary course of
business. They do not identify any activities of Kluss. On a comparative basis they may
demonstrate that the power use at the Kluss home is greater or lesser than similar
houses or at similar times or that the power use has increased or decreased at different
times. The information does not provide any intimate details of Kluss's life, identify his
friends or political and business associates, nor does it provide or complete a "virtual
current biography." The power records unlike telephone or bank records, do not reveal
discrete information about Kuss's activities. High power usage may be caused by any
one of numerous factors: hot tubs, arc welders,
poor insulation, ceramic or pottery kilns,
28 2
or indoor gardening under artificial lights.

Smart meter data can, of course, generate a great deal of
information about in-home activities. The greater visibility afforded to
in-home behaviors by smart meter data could thus cause some state
courts to revisit reliance on the third party doctrine to permit
warrantless access to utility records.
Thus, it seems possible, perhaps even likely, 28 3 that Fourth
Amendment doctrine 28 4 may evolve to limit the scope of the third party
doctrine in part to prevent technologically enabled invasions of
privacy; abolishment or weakening of the third party doctrine could
constrain government access to personal environmental information
generated by this technology. If the government were required to
281. Samson v. State, 919 P.2d 171, 172-73 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
282. State v. Kluss, 867 P.2d 247, 254 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993); see also Samson, 919 P.2d at
173 (citing State v. Kluss, 867 P.2d 247, 254 (Idaho 1993), in upholding warrantless access to
traditional utility records under Alaska's constitution); People v. Dunkin, 888 P.2d 305, 308
(Colo. App. 1994) (citing the reasoning in Kuss, 867 P.2d at 254, in upholding warrantless access
to traditional utility records under Colorado's constitution).
283. Katherine Strandburg, for example, predicts, based on "the trend of appellate court
rulings, along with the Supreme Court's conspicuous failure to rely on the third party doctrine
for an easy out in Quon," that "the Court will, at a minimum, eventually adopt a
content/noncontent distinction in the context of two-party communications." Strandburg, supra
note 32, at 643.
284. Or the interpretation of privacy rights contained in state constitutions.
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obtain a warrant even under the less demanding standard sometimes
applicable to administrative searches to access, for example, utility
smart meter records, this could pose a significant administrative
burden. As noted above, the administrative burdens of regulating
millions of individuals (as opposed to the smaller number of larger,
industrial sources of pollution) has long been recognized as an obstacle
to regulating environmentally significant individual behaviors, in
particular with respect to the enforcement of mandates on
individuals.285
Viewed together, the emerging privacy constraints on RFID
and smart meters and the threatened constriction of the third party
doctrine illustrate how privacy concerns can impact the deployment of
technology, including technology that can be used to generate personal
environmental information in support of the regulation of
environmentally significant individual behaviors. 286 However, privacy
limits on the use of RFID and smart meters and doctrinal pressure on
the third party doctrine do provide apt examples of how the ability of
technology to generate information about individual behaviors
frequently motivates calls for, and sometimes the development of, new
privacy protections that can limit the availability of personal
information to support regulation.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article's core claims are that: (1) technology is
increasingly making information about individual environmental
behaviors and associated harms more accessible; (2) better
information about environmentally significant individual behaviors
could meaningfully enhance fledgling efforts to regulate those
behaviors; and (3) use of technologically enabled personal
environmental information in support of regulation will require the
resolution of myriad privacy concerns. Successful resolution of the
tension between technologically enabled access to personal
environmental information, regulatory uses of that information, and
285. See supra notes 137-44 and accompanying text (describing how technology can reduce
enforcement burdens associated with applying mandates to environmentally significant
individual behaviors).
286. If faced with the prospect of securing a warrant to access information, the government
could explore alternatives for obtaining that information that would not require a warrant (such
as seeking consent or obtaining aggregated data scrubbed of personally identifiable information).
Other obstacles to the use of mandates, in chief political feasibility, constrain the possibilities for
imposing mandates on environmentally significant individual behaviors, particularly those that
would require the monitoring of in-home behavior. Kuh, supranote 9.
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privacy concerns will require an understanding of the potential
regulatory and environmental benefits of technologically enabled
access to personal environmental information, the constraints that
privacy protections can impose on regulatory efforts and
environmental results, and the type and significance of potential
privacy harms resulting from access to the information. This Article
identifies some of the benefits of technologically enabled access to
of
in the regulation
information
environmental
personal
environmentally significant individual behaviors, illustrates some of
the privacy concerns and constraints that can result, and urges
further contemplation of how best to value and understand claimed
privacy interests in personal environmental information. Engaging
the tension between regulation and privacy in this context is
important because where the regulatory and environmental benefits of
access to personal environmental information are not recognized or
understood, technology-specific privacy limits can inadvertently
frustrate access to personal environmental information and may be
too stringent because policymakers and the public do not weigh the
countervailing interests. 2 7 Where the privacy harms occasioned by
access to personal environmental information are not recognized or
adequately understood, policymakers risk a backlash when the
privacy implications of a policy become known. 28 8 And proceeding in
the absence of a thoughtful conceptualization of the value and
contours of privacy in the context of individual environmental harms
presents the risk that debates about balancing privacy and policy
objectives will reach undesirable outcomes that either over- or
undervalue the privacy interests at stake. 28 9 For all of these reasons,
environmental scholars and others should, in the words of Justice
Breyer, join a "national conversation" about how to reach an optimal
balance between access to personal environmental information and
privacy. 290

287. Overly robust privacy protections have been critiqued for giving rise to perverse
results. Hirsch, supra note 147, at 9 n.36 (describing disputes about "the importance of privacy
as a societal value").
288. Smart Grid Elevated to Top Issue by Leading Privacy Watchdogs, SMARTGRID TODAY
(Dec. 17, 2009), http://www.smartgridtoday.com/members/1060.cfm (" '[G]et one really salient
privacy invasion that makes the front page of the New York Times and the Washington Post and
you'll bring to a dead stop smart grid development."' (quoting Elias Quinn)).
289. Hirsch, supra note 147, at 9 n.36.
290. Breyer, supranote 36, at 263.
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